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PHE INTRODUCTION of laboratory exper- 
imentation in economics was moti- 
vated by theories of industrial organiza- 
tion and market performance. The first 
published market experiments were those 
of Edward H. Chamberlin (1948). He ex- 
plored the behavioral characteristics of 
markets he described as being "purely" 
but not "perfectly" competitive and he 
thought that the principles of monopolis- 
tic competition would be more useful than 
the textbook theory of demand and supply 
in explaining the observed behavior. Aus- 
tin C. Hoggatt (1959) and Heinz Sauer- 
mann and Reinhard Selten (1959) both fo- 
cused on markets with three competitors 
and independently provided the first ex- 
perimental evidence that the Cournot 
model might be a reasonably accurate de- 
scription of oligopolistic behavior. Oli- 
gopoly and bilateral monopoly motivated 
the classic work of Lawrence E. Fouraker 
and Sidney Siegel (1963) which intro- 
duced several of the techniques still used 
today. Vernon L. Smith's (1962) sensitivity 
to the organization of the U.S. security in- 
dustry led him to the fundamental discov- 
ery that the law of competitive demand 
and supply can be observed operating in 
an experimental environment. The field 
of experimental economics has experi- 
enced substantial evolution during the in- 
tervening twenty years. This paper is an 
attempt to provide an introduction to the 
methods and an assessment of available 
results which might now be useful to the 
students of industrial organization. 
The paper has six sections. Section I out- 
lines some of the step-by-step details of 
laboratory procedures. Sections II through 
IV summarize experimental results. In 
Section II markets with several partici- 
pants are analyzed and compared to a 
competitive model. Section III summa- 
rizes monopoly results. Section IV, which 
is the longest, deals with oligopoly. This 
organization of the material is natural 
from the point of view of traditional the- 
ory, but the organization is not necessarily 
natural from the point of view of results. 
1485 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Tue, 25 Feb 2014 18:38:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1486 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XX (December 1982) 
As will become evident from the following 
pages, market institutions have a substan- 
tial influence on performance and this in- 
fluence sometimes outweighs the impor- 
tance of market concentration and 
relative firm size. Consequently, on occa- 
sion it is easier to organize and summarize 
results according to market institutions as 
opposed to numbers, size, or other eco- 
nomic parameters. 
The fifth section addresses the obvious 
question regarding the relevance of labo- 
ratory methods. Section V outlines several 
common criticisms of experimental meth- 
ods, which define both the limitations and 
the qualifications that must accompany 
conclusions drawn from experimental evi- 
dence, and discusses them in terms of re- 
sults. The recent explosion of professional 
interest in experimental methods reflects, 
in part, a recognition that experimental 
methods provide a source of shared expe- 
rience for scholars who are developing 
and evaluating theories about compli- 
cated, naturally occurring processes. 
While laboratory processes are simple in 
comparison to naturally occurring pro- 
cesses, they are real processes in the sense 
that real people participate for real and 
substantial profits and follow real rules in 
doing so. It is precisely because they are 
real that they are interesting. General the- 
ories must apply to special cases, so models 
believed to be applicable to complicated 
naturally occurrinig processes should cer- 
tainly be expected to help explain what 
occurs in simple, special-case laboratory 
markets. Theories which do not apply to 
the special cases are not general theories 
and thus cannot be advocated as such. 
I. Laboratory Market Details 
Real markets are easy to create. The dif- 
ficult part is creating a market that dem- 
onstrates a point which remains valid 
upon replication in other subject pools 
and by other experimenters. Because we 
now know that market behavior is sensi- 
tive to both individual preferences and 
to the details of the structure of the institu- 
tional arrangements, the experimenter 
must avoid contaminating these variables 
with poorly developed experimental pro- 
cedures. If the experimental procedures 
do not control these variables adequately, 
attempts to replicate the results may fail 
because the experimenter has unknow- 
ingly failed to conduct the same experi- 
ment. This section is a brief outline of the 
procedures, methods, and measurements. 
A. Market Creation 
The key economic variables in all mar- 
kets are the value individuals place on the 
object being transacted, and the form of 
the market organization within which 
buyers and sellers interact. Preferences 
are induced by a special application of de- 
rived demand theory called induced pref- 
erence theory (Smith, 1976b; Plott, 1979). 
The theory takes advantage of the fact 
that principles of economics apply to all 
commodities which are valued indepen- 
dently of the source of individual values 
or the ultimate use to which the commodi- 
ties are to be put. In an experimental mar- 
ket subjects normally trade a commodity 
such as a chit of paper that has no intrinsic 
or use value. The commodity is given 
value by the experimental rules governing 
its creation by sellers and redemption 
value by buyers. Buyers make money by 
buying from sellers and reselling to the 
experimenter according to a predeter- 
mined redemption value schedule. The 
difference between the purchase price 
and redemption value is profit, which is 
the buyer's to keep. Sellers make a profit 
by purchasing units from the experimen- 
ter at a predetermined cost schedule and 
selling to the buyers. The difference is a 
profit which the seller keeps. In addition 
to these profits, participants sometimes re- 
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ceive a small commission for each trade. 
The role of the commission will be ex- 
plained below. 
The idea is deceptively simple. The key 
assumptions are that an individual prefers 
more money to less, has no attitude to- 
ward the commodity or situation other 
than the advantages created by potential 
resale, and that the individual fully under- 
stands the terms of resale. If these condi- 
tions hold, the redemption and cost sched- 
ules are limit price schedules for the 
subjects. The first column of Figure 1 con-. 
tains an example of what buyers typically 
see. Row 1 shows the redemption value 
of the first unit this individual purchases 
during a period. The purchase price is en- 
tered in row 2, and the profit and profit 
plus commission are entered in rows 3 and 
4 respectively. As can be seen, these en- 
tries are made for each purchase during 
a period. 
Neglecting the commission for a mo- 
ment, the incentives of individual i can 
be represented by a total revenue func- 
tion Ri(xi) indicating the revenue gener- 
ated by a quantity of purchases xi. The 
magnitude Ri(xi) - Ri(xi - 1), the re- 
demption value for the xi th. unit can be 
seen as a limit price function. In the exam- 
ple shown in Figure 1 it is negatively 
sloped, but of course the slope as well as 
the pattern of such redemption value 
functions across agents are parameters un- 
der the control of the experimenter. Un- 
der competitive assumptions this redemp- 
tion value schedule is the individual's 
inverse demand schedule. Thus the exper- 
imenter, by varying these parameters, can 
control demand elasticity, market concen- 
tration, and other magnitudes of eco- 
nomic interest. 
Incentives of suppliers are induced in 
a similar manner. The second column in 
Figure 1 demonstrates the technique for 
a typical individual supplier. Row 2 con- 
tains the cost of the first unit sold. This 
cost is incurred at the time of the sale. 
When the sale is made, the seller enters 
the selling price in the first row and then 
calculates the profits and profit plus com- 
mission as directed by rows 3 and 4. The 
profit from other sales made during this 
period is similarly calculated. Thus, indi- 
vidual i has a cost function Ci(xi), and the 
marginal cost, Ci(xz) - Ci(xi - 1), has al- 
ready been calculated for the individual 
as shown on the forms. The shapes of the 
cost functions across sellers determine 
supply elasticity, concentration and entry, 
and are controlled by the experimenter. 
At the top of Figure 1 you will notice 
a period indicator. Experimental markets 
are usually conducted over a series of peri- 
ods or "trading days." The length of a pe- 
riod is normally from five to fifteen min- 
utes depending upon the volume of 
activity anticipated. Unless the commod- 
ity has some explicit properties of an asset 
which has a life over time (Robert For- 
sythe, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Plott, 1982), 
each period is like an independent trading 
day with demands, supplies, profit poten- 
tial, etc., independent of (but possibly 
identical with) those of previous periods. 
It is well established that trading patterns 
change as the market days are replicated. 
No good model of this dynamic exists but, 
as will be demonstrated below, the market 
equilibration process occurs with the rep- 
lication of market periods. 
Whether an individual is shown the re- 
demption value for all periods at one time 
or just for one period at a time varies ac- 
cording to the purpose of the experiment. 
In many cases the individual knows his/ 
her own redemption values for all periods 
at the beginning of the experiment, but 
there are important exceptions. If individ- 
ual costs or redemption values are chang- 
ing each period, for example, these would 
be revealed one at a time just before a 
period began. In almost all experiments 
the individual knows only his/her re- 
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Redemption Values Costs 
Individual Buyer Number Individual Seller Number 
Period Period 
Unit Row Value Unit ow Value 
1 1st unit redemption value $2.00 1 selling price 
2 purchase price 2 'cost of 1st unit $ .25 
3 profit 3 profit 
4 profit + 15? commission 4 profit + 15? commission 
5 2nd unit redemption value $1.50 5 selling price 
6 purchase price 6 cost of 2nd unit $ .75 
2 2 
7 profit 7 profit 
8 profit + 15? commission 8 profit + 15? commission 
9 3rd unit redemption value $1.00 9 selling price 
10 purchase price 10 cost of 3rd unit $1.00 
3-3- 
11 profit 11 profit 
12 profit + 15? commission 12 profit + 15? commission 
13 4th unit redemption value $ .75 13 selling price 
14 purchase price 14 cost of 4th unit $1.25 
4-4- 
15 profit 15 profit 
16 profit + 15? commission 16 profit + 15? commission 
17 5th unit redemption value $ .25 17 selling price 
18 purchase price 18 cost of 5th unit $1.75 
5 5- 
19 profit 19 profit 
20 profit + 15? commission 20 profit + 15? commission 
Total period earnings Total period earnings 
Figure 1. Redemption and Cost Incentive Forms 
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demption value and nothing about the re- 
demption value of others.' The proce- 
dures and instructions are designed to 
keep this type of information private. 
Commissions are not always used. It is 
known that individuals tend not to trade 
units unless there is some advantage for 
doing so. The function of the commission 
is thus to induce marginal trades by over- 
coming what seems to be a small transac- 
tions cost (Plott and Smith, 1978). Subjects 
are instructed not to trade at prices which 
are above (below) redemption values, thus 
avoiding the problem of including the 
commission as part of the limit price. More 
recent experimentation has dropped the 
use of commission and avoided the "mar- 
ginal trade" problem by adjusting the 
market parameters to allow for some gains 
from trade at the margin. 
The institutional organization of a mar- 
ket has been an important treatment vari- 
able. The mechanics of how buyers and 
sellers get together can substantially influ- 
ence market performance. That is, for the 
same underlying incentives, the market 
performance is affected by a change of 
institutions. For example, the original ex- 
periments by Chamberlin (1948) had the 
agents circulating in a room and privately 
negotiating price when a buyer or seller 
was contacted. In some of these markets 
terms of trade were publicly displayed on 
the blackboard as they were consum- 
mated, while in others they were not. This 
market behaves much differently than, 
say, an oral double auction. In an oral dou- 
ble auction all bids and offers are orally 
tendered and publicly displayed, and only 
one outstanding (the last, the best, etc.) 
bid and offer open at any time. Sellers 
(buyers) are free to accept an outstanding 
bid (offer) by a public, verbal indication. 
Thus, in the oral double auction, all bids, 
offers, and contracts are public informa- 
tion. 
Much of traditional industrial organiza- 
tion theory was developed to meet a need 
for understanding economic processes in 
which the market institutions themselves 
are endogenous. Questions regarding 
market conduct, market practices, cartel 
development and evolution are all of pri- 
mary importance, but they have not yet 
been addressed by experimentalists who, 
with very few exceptions, have tended to 
treat institutional variables as exogenous. 
Such decisions by experimentalists reflect, 
in part, a need for more theory about the 
creation and evolution of market institu- 
tions. 
Five prominent forms of market institu- 
tions have been studied in the experimen- 
tal literature: (a) auction markets, (b) 
posted-bid (offer) markets, (c) negotiated- 
price (telephone) markets, (d) markets 
with price protection and advance notice 
policies, and (e) sealed-bid (offer) markets. 
Actually, the listing of only five different 
types involves an oversimplification. Each 
of these types can be subdivided further 
into special types. Auction markets, for ex- 
ample, can be either English or Dutch ac- 
cording to whether the prices start low 
and are bid up by competition or start 
high and are reduced until some competi- 
tor accepts. English auctions can be "oral 
double" or "one-sided." Markets differ ac- 
cording to whether or not the terms of 
contracts are public and the sequence in 
which bids, offers, and terms become 
known. The possibilities are so numerous 
that it sometimes seems more appropriate 
to think in terms of a continuum rather 
than fixed classes. For example, posted- 
price auctions look very similar to "sealed- 
bid" auctions if sellers must post prices 
without the knowledge of the prices of 
other sellers and without the ability to im- 
I Only one market experiment has allowed such 
complete information and it did not converge as ex- 
pected (Smith, 1981). Bargaining experiments re- 
ported in Alvin E. Roth, Michael W. K. Malauf, and 
J. Keith Murnigham (1981) also suggest that models 
must be modified in the presence of an informational 
environment in which all monetary values are 
known by all agents. 
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mediately "adjust" prices in light of the 
competition. 
B. Laboratory Procedures 
The experimental procedures are one 
of the most important aspects of an experi- 
ment. The wording and the format of the 
instructions in most experiments have 
evolved so that very little about them is 
arbitrary or has escaped careful scrutiny. 
This extreme care is dictated by two over- 
riding concerns. First, the procedures 
must be formulated so that other research- 
ers, when following them, will be able to 
replicate reported results. The heart of 
the experimental method is replication 
and the procedures embody the opera- 
tional content of many of the parameters 
and experimental conditions which, if 
changed, may induce different results. If 
results are to replicate with different sub- 
ject pools and different experimenters, 
then the procedures must be carefully 
considered. Secondly, there is a wide- 
spread belief that experimenters will or 
can influence the behavior of subjects by 
subtle suggestion about what the experi- 
menter wants to demonstrate. Whether 
this belief is well founded is open to ques- 
tion,2 but regardless of the answer the pro- 
cedures must minimize the potential for 
such influences if the results are to be 
taken seriously by a large number of peo- 
ple. 
Each of thq procedural steps is subject 
to experimental control. Typically, sub- 
jects are recruited by announcements in 
class, bulletin boards, or newspapers.3 
Once subjects are assembled, the instruc- 
tions are read and questions answered. 
Sometimes a practice period, or period 
zero in which no money is at stake, is con- 
ducted. The technology used during the 
experiment is dictated by many consider- 
ations including availability. Many experi- 
ments simply utilize a classroom with a 
chalkboard to record trades. Faculty of- 
fices and the connecting telephone sys- 
tem, the word processing system from 
typing pools, and even special electronic 
equipment designed for the experiment 
have been used. The most fully automated 
experiments are those using an interactive 
computer system called PLATO which al- 
lows subjects to be located in different cit- 
ies (Arlington W. Williams, 1980). Because 
computerized procedures involve high 
setup costs, they are typically not used to 
explore radically new (from an experi- 
mentalist's point of view) forms of market 
institutions and organization. 
The Appendix contains sample instruc- 
tions for posted-price markets and for 
oral auctions. Notice that subjects are not 
told to maximize or to make as much 
money as possible. Furthermore, words 
like "competition," "maximizing, " "col- 
lusion," "coalition," etc., or other words 
which might suggest to the subject some 
theory or expectation on the part of the 
experimenter, have been carefully omit- 
ted. The examples used to illustrate ac- 
counting conventions and profit computa- 
tions are standard across many different 
experiments. In fact, attempts are made 
to maintain-across vastly different types 
of experiments (e.g., committees vs. mar- 
kets)-as much of the wording and exam- 
ples as possible in order to minimize the 
latitude for theories which seek to explain 
the results of a particular experimental se- 
ries in terms of the language used in the 
instructions for that series. The instruc- 
tions make clear the opportunities availa- 
ble to the subjects, but the motivation is 
supplied by the people. 
The procedures can differ according to 
the purposes of the experiment. For exam- 
2A possible example within the framework re- 
viewed in this paper is explored in Linda Cohen, 
Michael E. Levine, and Plott (1978). The case is one 
in which the subjects in a committee experiment 
evidently thought they were to provide insights for 
marketing strategies and ignored the incentive sys- 
tem in an attempt to do so. 
3 Sample announcements can be found in Eliza- 
beth Hoffman and Plott (forthcoming). 
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ple, marginal values are displayed in Fig- 
ure 1 as opposed to total values so subjects 
need not compute the former in making 
decisions. It was done for them. The indi- 
viduals take tests at the end of the instruc- 
tion period to see if they can read these 
tables as hypothesized. After each of the 
first several periods, each individual's ac- 
counting is checked to see if there is any 
misunderstanding about the reward struc- 
ture. Questions about the mechanics of 
calculating profits are welcomed and an- 
swered fully and openly. Yet, if someone 
asks, "What am I supposed to do?" the 
experimenter rereads the relevant por- 
tion of the instructions: "The experimen- 
ters do not care whether or how you par- 
ticipate so long as you stay within the 
confines of the rules." Presumably, if the 
capacity of an individual to understand 
or to recognize a reward structure was a 
variable to be studied as part of the mar- 
ket, then all of these procedures should 
possibly be changed, but for most of the 
experiments reviewed here this was not 
an objective. 
Some of the procedures are adopted to 
allow individuals as much "indepen- 
dence" from the social situation as possi- 
ble. Social security numbers and names 
(both of which are used as receipts for the 
monetary payments) are collected after 
the experiment is over. Individuals are 
paid in private so others need never know 
their earnings. When individuals are obvi- 
ously confused or are having difficulty 
with the instructions, efforts are made to 
avoid any embarrassment. Commodity 
names or references to "similar" types of 
natural situations (stock markets, automo- 
bile industry, etc.) are usually not used in 
order to avoid giving some impression 
about how individuals are expected to act. 
The level of incentives is typically some- 
what above the hourly wage for the sub- 
ject pool. For upper class undergraduate 
or graduate students the expected earn- 
ings are in the eight to ten dollars per 
hour range if the models are reasonably 
accurate. Employed adults participating 
at night or on weekends would earn more. 
Sometimes a flat payment, promised as a 
minimum in order to attract subjects, is 
paid at the beginning of the experiment 
in addition to money earned during the 
experiment. 
From a pragmatic point of view experi- 
mentalists realize that their experiments 
will be checked by other researchers. 
Such researchers may have a vested inter- 
est in having the results not replicate. This 
is especially true in fields like industrial 
organization in which the data can be- 
come part of an adversary process. An un- 
ambiguous and complete set of experi- 
mental procedures is an important source 
of protection. 
C. Performance Measures 
Price patterns, volume, distribution, 
and market efficiency are variables of ob- 
vious interest. Usually price is measured 
as the average of contract prices during 
a period but sometimes it means the last 
contract in a period. Volume and income 
distribution are easily observed. 
Efficiency as introduced by Plott and 
Smith (1978) is more subtle, but the reader 
should note that it is exactly the traditional 
consumers' plus producers' surplus notion. 
In market experiments the system attains 
an efficient (Pareto optimal) allocation if 
and only if the subjects as a group maxi- 
mize the total monetary payments from 
the experimenter. Thus, the relative effi- 
ciency of systems is determined by com- 
paring the total payment to subjects with 
the maximum possible total payment. 
In order to demonstrate how this mea- 
sure of efficiency is related to ideas of con- 
sumers' plus producers' surplus, consider 
Figure 2. Assume the economy has two 
demanders, numbered 1 and 2, and two 
suppliers, numbered 3 and 4. The de- 
manders are identical and each has the 
redemption values shown in Figure 1. The 
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Price 
1 2 $2.00 
1.75 - 
3 4 
1 2 
1.50 
1.25 
3 4 
1 2 
1.00 34 
1 2 
.75- 3 4 
.50- 
1 2 
.25 
3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Units Per Period 
Figure 2. Aggregated Li1mit Values 
suppliers are also identical and each has 
the marginal cost schedule in Figure 1. 
The market demand function is obtained 
by adding the (inverted) individual limit 
price functions, and the market supply is 
obtained by adding the (inverted) individ- 
ual marginal cost functions. As can be 
seen, consumer plus producer surplus is 
maximized at six units with each buyer 
(seller) buying (selling) three (three) units. 
A quick check indicates that this allocation 
also maximizes total subject profits from 
the experiment. If, for example, another 
unit was purchased, the subjects' payment 
to the experimenter (marginal cost) would 
exceed experimenter payment to the sub- 
jects (redemption value) on this unit. Total 
profits would thus be decreased. 
A typical market inefficiency would be 
of the following sort. Individual 3 from 
Figure 2 sells four units and individual 4 
sells one. Exactly why and how this might 
occur is, of course, material for the field 
of industrial organization. From Figure 2 
one can see that individual 3's fourth unit 
should have been excluded from the mar- 
ket because its cost is greater than the 
marginal benefit. Furthermore, individual 
4's second and perhaps third unit should 
have been included in the market because 
the marginal social benefit was no less 
than the cost of these units. 
The efficiency measure must be inter- 
preted with some care. In some studies 
the commissions are included as part of 
the measure while in the other studies 
they are not. Including them makes the 
measure sensitive to whether or not the 
marginal (zero profit) traces are made, 
thereby capturing one aspect of effi- 
ciency.4 On the other hand, the commis- 
sion seems to have no natural economic 
interpretation. 
The efficiency measure is also sensitive 
to the shapes of the curves as are all sur- 
plus measures. Suppose, for example, the 
first unit redemption values are increased 
by a factor of ten and the first unit mar- 
ginal costs are reduced to zero. Because 
these units will almost surely trade and 
now constitute a large proportion of the 
surplus, the system efficiency would in- 
crease for any expected pattern of trading. 
Thus, by adjusting the level of the base 
profit potential with intramarginal units 
that will almost certainly trade, the abso- 
lute efficiency levels can be influenced. 
A similar possibility exists with the allo- 
cation of redemption values across in- 
dividuals. Suppose the two redemption 
values of $.75 were held by a third and 
fourth individual who have the right to 
buy only the one unit. If either of these 
two individuals make a trade, efficiency 
drops. Since they have only one (ineffi- 
cient) unit to trade, they stand ready to 
trade and will trade should the price ever 
4Notice that without a commission the marginal 
trades under the conditions of Figure 2 may not be 
made. There are no gains from an exchange of the 
third unit of one and three for example. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Tue, 25 Feb 2014 18:38:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Plott: Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics 1493 
"wander" down in that range. Thus, these 
units seem to have more opportunity to 
be traded than when they are held as the 
fourth unit by the original two traders. 
In the latter case, inefficient trading can 
occur only if the price wanders low 
enough after an individual has traded 
three units. 
Other special problems with efficiency 
measures occur in the case of uncertainty. 
Thus far, experiments involving risk have 
had only a limited relevance to the indus- 
trial organization literature and will not 
be reviewed here (Plott and Shyam Sun- 
der, 1982). The important point is that 
comparisons of efficiencies across markets 
with different economic parameters must 
be treated with care. If the underlying 
economic parameters are held constant 
and the institutions alone are changed, the 
efficiency comparison has a more solid ba- 
sis. 
II. Competitive Market Models 
A. Auction Markets 
The competitive model seems to work 
best when markets are organized as oral 
double auctions. Oral auction markets are 
characterized by public bids (offers) to buy 
(sell) units and the freedom of any partici- 
pant to accept terms which (s)he wishes. 
Several variants exist depending upon the 
length of time or circumstances under 
which a bid (offer) remains outstanding, 
whether the bid (offer) is made orally or 
logged through a computer, the roll of the 
specialist's "book," etc.5 
The overwhelming result is that these 
markets converge to the competitive 
equilibrium even with very few traders. 
Figure 3, which shows the price of every 
sale in the order in which it occurred, is 
typical. Each period represents a market 
day with a given demand and supply. The 
competitive equilibrium is $2 with a vol- 
ume per period of eight contracts. As mar- 
ket days are replicated under identical 
conditions, prices tend to converge to the 
competitive equilibrium. Efficiency levels 
tend to converge to near 100 percent. If 
a change in parameters occurs, such as a 
shift in demand or supply, the prices con- 
verge to the new equilibrium after two 
or three periods. 
As long as the industrial structure has 
a few buyers and sellers, these conver- 
gence and efficiency properties appear to 
be independent of the basic economic 
conditions. Different shapes of demands 
and supplies as systematically examined 
by Smith (1962, 1965, 1976a) yield no sub- 
stantial differences. The variations ex- 
plored covered various cases of demand 
elasticity and nonlinearity. In Smith (1965) 
a completely inelastic (in the relevant 
range) demand was used along with a fixed 
supply (greater than the quantity de- 
manded). In all cases, after a few periods, 
the market performance was close to that 
predicted by the competitive model. 
Basic economic conditions do seem to 
influence the direction of convergence to 
equilibrium, and thus the distribution of 
income and profit. The path to equilib- 
rium seems to be from above (below) if 
consumer's (producer's) surplus is greater 
than producer's (consumer's) surplus 
(Smith and A. W. Williams, forthcoming). 
Thus, one might expect that markets with 
relatively steep demands and reasonably 
flat supplies, record somewhat elevated 
profits for the sellers relative to the com- 
petitive equilibrium. These profits would 
accrue at disequilibrium trades and so the 
phenomenon would also be accompanied 
by falling prices. If the industry has been 
5Typically bids are tendered verbally. An auc- 
tioneer, upon hearing a bid (offer) writes the bid 
(offer) and the index of the agent on the chalkboard. 
The bid (offer) is repeated verbally and the floor is 
then open for new bids and offers. Only the last bid 
and offer are standing and they remain standing until 
accepted, cancelled or replaced. Under "New York 
rules" a replacing bid or offer must be an improve- 
ment upon the standing bid or offer. Acceptance 
can occur at any time. 
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Figure 3. Oral Double-Auction Markets 
Source: Smith (? 1976a, New York University, Chart 6, p. 53. Reprinted by permission of New York University 
Press.) 
characterized by unanticipated demand 
or supply shifts, prices and profits can be 
affected. Adjustment to a new equilibrium 
takes time, and profits or losses can cer- 
tainly reflect disequilibrium trades. To 
date only one study has attempted to char- 
acterize the dynamic adjustment path 
(Smith, 1965) and the conclusions from 
this are clouded by the fact that the choice 
of the estimation technique affects the 
conclusion regarding which dynamic ad- 
justment theory Smith's data support (For- 
rest D. Nelson, 1980). No compelling the- 
ory of dynamic adjustment exists, and 
experimental studies have not yet ex- 
plored the influence of basic economic 
conditions on adjustment paths suffi- 
ciently to provide any further generaliza- 
tions. 
Figure 4 has been added to show a typi- 
cal adjustment path for an oral double auc- 
tion when producer's surplus is greater 
than consumer's surplus. The path is from 
below. If the relative surpluses were re- 
versed, the approach, according to cur- 
rently accepted hypotheses, would be 
from above. The key parameter is the sur- 
pluses, however, and not demand or sup- 
ply slopes, although in the case of linear 
functions these are obviously closely re- 
lated. 
Changes in the market institutions are 
known to influence price and profit pat- 
terns. For example, oral double auctions 
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Figure 4. Oral Double-Auction Market 
Source: Smith ((?)1976a, New York University, Chart 3, p. 50. Reprinted by permission of New York University 
Press.) 
conducted by computer can affect the 
speed of convergence especially with 
inexperienced participants (A. W. Wil- 
liams, 1980). However, the most dramatic 
differences in behavior within the class of 
oral auction institutions occurs with the 
one-sided auctions. The approach to equi- 
librium is from above (below) if the auc- 
tion is a one-sided bid (offer) auction. If 
buyers (sellers) can bid (offer) while sellers 
(buyers) must accept or reject without 
making counter offer (bids), then the ap- 
proach is from above (below). The distri- 
bution of income is against the side which 
articulates the terms (Smith, 1964; Plott 
and Smith, 1978). That is, if buyers bid 
while sellers make no counter offers, the 
distribution goes against the buyers. Ex- 
actly why this occurs is not known but 
some sort of "counterspeculation" seems 
to be occurring and both the dynamics 
and the performance seem to be very sim- 
ilar to the Dutch auctions to be described 
later. The "accepting" side of the market 
seems to anticipate as a group the poten- 
tial for increased (decreased) prices as 
buyers (sellers) bid (offer) in competition 
among themselves. Even though a precise 
theoretical model does not exist, notice 
the implication of the result. Sellers who 
face an oral auction institution would 
prefer that the buyers bid. To the extent 
sellers can organize themselves to com- 
pete by accepting favorable bids and not 
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making counter offers, the approach to 
equilibrium and thus profits will be influ- 
enced in their favor. Similarly, markets 
organized as oral offer markets may have 
some use as tools to counteract "unjus- 
tified market power" of sellers. It is 
important to note, however, that the 
nonmonopolized one-sided oral auctions 
examined to date have all been nearly 100 
percent efficient. The institution affects 
only the distribution of income. 
The range of market structures that has 
been systematically explored is not wide 
because the results under the oral auction 
institutions examined thus far appear to 
be almost independent of market struc- 
ture. Experiments with three and four 
sellers converge with regularity to the 
competitive equilibrium. If influences 
from market structure exist for nonmo- 
nopolized markets under the oral double 
auction, they are not so pronounced as 
to be easily detectable. 
The performance of the oral double auc- 
tion has stimulated two important types 
of basic research. The first is to gain some 
understanding of the process which 
guides the market to near the competitive 
equilibrium (David Easley and John 0. 
Ledyard, 1980; C. B. Garcia, 1981). The 
second is to design institutions which are 
even more efficient than the oral double 
auction (Smith et al., 1982; Patrick Joyce, 
1981). Perhaps as the first task advances, 
the second task will be easier. 
B. Negotiated Prices (Telephone Market) 
Negotiated price markets are those 
within which the terms of trade are pri- 
vately negotiated with each transaction. 
Experimentally these conditions have 
been implemented through a telephone 
system where buyers and sellers, each lo- 
cated in a separate office, negotiate pri- 
vately by telephone. Buyers and sellers 
can call each other and discuss terms and/ 
or agree on a contract price. Contact 
among buyers or among sellers is usually 
prevented so that information about 
prices is not public. Buyers can shop 
among sellers, shopping costs are low (in 
some experiments advertising is permit- 
ted), and shopping and negotiating are the 
only sources of information. 
The first experiments of this kind were 
done by James T. Hong and Plott (1982). 
The distribution of prices from one such 
experiment is shown in Figure 5. As can 
be seen, the system begins with a wide 
variance in prices. Evidently some buyers 
are just better negotiators than others but 
the source of this (dis)advantage, whether 
they shop more (less), or make more (less) 
credible promises or threats, etc., is un- 
known. 
With time the variance shrinks. The 
mean price approaches the competitive 
equilibrium. When demand shifts (periods 
5 and 9) the prices approach the new equi- 
librium. Efficiency in these markets is in 
the 80 to 90 percent range as shown in 
the figure. Volume in the Hong and Plott 
experiments is greater than the competi- 
tive equilibrium volume. This result, 
when combined with those of Chamberlin 
(1948), suggests that poor information may 
result in sales exceeding the competitive 
equilibrium. 
Only two different industrial structures 
have been explored within this market in- 
stitution. The Hong and Plott study had 
eleven buyers of about equal size. The 22 
sellers ranged from relatively large (the 
five largest firms had 60 percent of the 
market) to relatively small sellers, some 
of whom should not be able to make trans- 
actions, according to the competitive 
model because their costs were above the 
competitive equilibrium price. The price- 
time series shows that the competitive 
model is a reasonably accurate predictor 
of equilibrium, but some marginal sellers 
were able to sell at prices above the com- 
petitive equilibrium price to buyers who 
were evidently poorly informed or did not 
choose to shop. 
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Figure 5. Telephone Market 
The second study by David M. Grether 
and Plott (1981) examined telephone mar- 
kets with two large sellers (each with 35 
percent of the market) and two small sell- 
ers (15 percent each). Sellers in the experi- 
ment even had accurate knowledge of the 
market demand functions. The average 
prices, shown in Figure 6, are typical of 
the general results. Similar to the Hong 
and Plott results, prices initially have a 
high variance. With time, variance is re- 
duced and the competitive equilibrium is 
approached. 
A third study by Heinz Jiirgen Cross- 
mann (1982) was not a telephone market. 
Individual negotiations took place in pri- 
vate booths. Prices and other terms of con- 
tracts were strictly private information, so 
information was less available than in tele- 
phone markets in which several shopping 
calls could be made easily. Multiple-unit 
or block trades were possible. Sellers were 
required to make binding quantity deci- 
sions prior to the opening of a market pe- 
riod. On average, prices were near the 
competitive equilibrium relative to the 
predictions of other static models. The 
smooth adjustments toward the long-run 
competitive equilibrium are not always 
present, and in some markets the move- 
ment is away from the long-run equilib- 
rium. However, in these cobweb, unsta- 
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ble markets there exist no pronounced cy- 
cles. 
C. Posted Prices 
In posted-price markets all prices are 
public and no discounts are made from 
the posted prices. Furthermore, posted 
prices are changed only after some period 
of advanced registration. In experimental 
markets the institution is implemented as 
follows. The posting agents decide be- 
tween market periods what price to post 
in the next period. Each agent makes a 
private pricing decision and submits the 
price to the experimenter. After collect- 
ing the prices the experimenter an- 
nounces all prices, and the market opens. 
No price changes from posted prices are 
allowed during a period. 
The posted-price institution has re- 
ceived more scholarly attention than any 
other. Frequently, however, those con- 
ducting the research did not view them- 
selves as engaged in a comparative institu- 
tional analysis. The original duopoly 
experiments of Hoggatt (1959) and of 
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) can be inter- 
preted as posted-price institutions as can 
almost all "market games" and "prisoner's 
dilemma" experiments. Nevertheless, it 
was not until 1978 (Plott and Smith) that 
it became recognized that the posted- 
price institution has its own independent 
effects. 
Two generalizations seem possible at 
this time. First, posted-offer (bid) markets 
tend to have higher (lower) prices than 
do oral double auction markets in that the 
adjustment to equilibrium tends to be 
from above (below) and either converges 
to equilibrium more slowly or does not 
converge at all. Secondly, efficiency tends 
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Source: Plott and Smith (1978, p. 135). 
to be lower in the posted-price markets 
than in the oral double auctions. 
These tendencies were first observable 
in experiments run by Fred Williams 
(1973) who incorrectly thought they were 
due to the fact that his traders could buy 
or sell more than one unit. Previous ex- 
periments were oral auctions in which 
each subject could trade only one unit. 
Williams was interested in traders who 
controlled multiple units, but in moving 
from one type of incentive structure to 
the other he also changed the market in- 
stitution. The results of two of his experi- 
ments are shown in Figure 7. These show 
the cumulative volume of trades at each 
price (e.g., the curve indicates the number 
of trades at price P or above). Prices at 
first are removed from equilibrium ($.60), 
but with time they converge closely to it. 
Whether or not posted-price markets ever 
stabilize at the competitive equilibrium 
is an open question since not all posted- 
price markets exhibit such monotone be- 
havior as those in the figure. Certainly 
convergence does not occur within the 
number of periods that produce conver- 
gence in oral auctions. 
The Williams results were replicated by 
Plott and Smith (1978), who also demon- 
strated by conducting multiple units, oral 
auction markets, that the market institu- 
tion and not multiple units is the cause. 
The possible importance of basic market 
conditions and market structure under 
posted prices is investigated in Hoffman 
and Plott (1981) and Hong and Plott 
(1982). In the former, posted prices in 
markets with storage and speculation 
were studied. In the latter the experimen- 
tal market had thirty-three sellers, as op- 
posed to the four in all other experiments. 
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The two generalizations were observed to 
hold in all cases. 
The Plott and Smith experiments and 
many subsequent experiments allowed 
buyers to withhold purchases and play fa- 
vorites to encourage low prices. Some of 
the Williams experiments used a com- 
puter to stimulate demanders according 
to the following strategy: first, purchase 
from the low-priced seller all s(he) wished 
to sell, and then move to the next low- 
priced seller, continuing until excess de- 
mand is exhausted. One of the principal 
discoveries of Plott and Smith was that 
their demanders behaved passively (or 
purely competitively), almost exactly like 
the Williams computer. This suggests that 
one of the major features of the posted- 
price market is that the "power" of the 
nonposting side is somehow eliminated. 
Intuitively, when facing posted prices, ab- 
stinence from purchases (sales) is unlikely 
to produce more favorable terms because 
once the price is posted it cannot be 
changed until after the period is over. 
The buyer anticipations, gaming, and/or 
"counterspeculation" conjectured as im- 
portant in explaining the behavior of one- 
sided oral auctions seems to be absent in 
one-sided posted-price markets. 
D. Multiple Markets and Endogenous 
Qualities 
Experimental research on multiple 
markets which interact sequentially or 
simultaneously has proceeded slowly be- 
cause they are difficult to control and they 
are time consuming. For example, a multi- 
ple market experiment can easily require 
three hours. 
In the first multiple market experiment 
(Ross M. Miller, Plott, and Smith, 1977) 
each of two markets could be interpreted 
as a season with the possibility of carry 
forward and speculation. Production in 
period A could be carried forward to pe- 
riod B. The competitive model is an accu- 
rate model of the market behavior. The 
results have been replicated by A. W. Wil- 
liams (1979), Hoffman and Plott (1981), 
and Plott and Jonathan T. Uhl (1981)6 and 
extended to include autarchy markets, 
posted prices, and middlemen. The same 
general framework has been modified to 
study rational expectations models as ap- 
plied to the behavior of a two-period asset 
and a futures market (Forsythe, Palfrey, 
and Plott, 1982). Four simultaneous and 
interdependent (complements) markets 
have been studied in connection with the 
problem of allocating scheduled landing 
rights at the major airports (Grether, R. 
Mark Isaac, and Plott, 1979; 1981). In all 
cases multiple markets are observed con- 
verging to predictable equilibria, and the 
efficiency levels of the entire system are 
in the upper 90 percent. 
Two studies can be interpreted as bear- 
ing on the issue of endogenous products 
or product quality. The first was not moti- 
vated by industrial organization at all but 
by the rational expectations models of fi- 
nance and the possibility that securities 
markets are capable of transferring infor- 
mation about an underlying state of na- 
ture possessed by "insiders" to other, 
uninformed participants in the market 
(Plott and Sunder, 1982). The experiments 
convincingly demonstrate that this can oc- 
cur. The relationship with industrial orga- 
nization arises because the results can be 
interpreted as demonstrating the possibil- 
ity that product quality, as determined by 
an underlying state parameter, can be re- 
vealed to the uninformed through the 
competition among those who are in- 
formed. It is as though consumers buy 
from retailers who buy from a common 
producer but have different information 
about product quality. 
The second study was motivated by the 
6This study involved a slight variant of the oral 
double auction. Bids and offers were left open until 
accepted or changed. Thus, the market institutions 
were similar to an oral double auction with limit 
orders and an open book. 
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market for physicians' services, automo- 
bile mechanics, insurance, etc. (Plott and 
Louis L. Wilde, forthcoming). In all cases 
the consumer must rely on the informa- 
tion possessed by the seller who may not 
have an incentive to tell the truth. The 
markets were constructed to perform 
poorly according to the predictions of the 
standard models because the information 
transmitted was likely to be inaccurate. 
The major result was that the markets 
failed to fail. The "lemons" phenomenon 
or "overselling" of profitable services 
characteristic of market failure theory, 
was not observed. In fact, buyers did bet- 
ter by relying on the advice of sellers than 
they did when they were trained to make 
their own diagnosis. The authors conjec- 
tured that the cause of so much "truth" 
was the search behavior of buyers. With 
search a seller may conclude that the best 
policy is to give the buyer the same infor- 
mation that was given by the other sellers 
in hope that the buyer will believe the 
seller, stop searching, and make a pur- 
chase. Each seller, believing other sellers 
are offering "good" advice, then would 
have an incentive to do the same. This 
is purely conjectural, however, and the 
theory explaining the performance of this 
market remains an open question. 
III. Monopoly 
Two different types of monopoly experi- 
ments have been conducted. The first, and 
possibly the most relevant for industrial 
organization theorists, is a market that has 
a single seller with a variable supply. In 
the second case, a single seller has a fixed 
supply which is to be auctioned or other- 
wise completely sold according to some 
type of competitive bidding process. 
A. Variable Supply and Contested 
Markets 
The difference in market performance 
under oral auctions, as opposed to posted 
prices when there are several sellers, leads 
naturally to an inquiry about the case of 
a single seller. Monopoly experiments un- 
der both institutions (Smith, 1981; Smith 
and A. W. Williams, 1981a) provide a dra- 
matic demonstration of the importance of 
both market structure and the institu- 
tional environment in determining mar- 
ket performance. 
Monopoly can definitely cause prices to 
diverge from the competitive equilib- 
rium. However, when the market is orga- 
nized as an oral double auction, the stan- 
dard monopoly model does not do so well. 
There is a strong tendency for prices to 
erode away from the monopoly equilib- 
rium price. On occasion, in Smith's experi- 
ments the prices actually approached the 
competitive equilibrium. The data are suf- 
ficiently mixed and the number of obser- 
vations are so small that we cannot deter- 
mine which model, the monopoly model 
or the pure competitive model, will be 
the easiest to modify to capture the behav- 
ior for monopolized oral double auctions. 
Figure 8 reproduces the time series from 
a particularly interesting experiment. It 
illustrates the difficulty of reaching any 
general conclusions about the compara- 
tive accuracy of the models. Prices start 
high near the monopoly price, erode to 
the competitive equilibrium, return to the 
high levels, and begin to erode again. For 
the most part volume is closer to the mo- 
nopoly level of five than to the competi- 
tive level of eight units. This interesting 
behavior seems to be attributable to the 
considerable power of buyers in this insti- 
tution. Perhaps by "counterspeculation" 
they tend to withhold purchases and force 
prices down when facing a monopolist. 
Exactly what coordinates this action is un- 
known (these buyers cannot communicate 
except through bids and offers) but, as will 
be shown below, certain institutions seem 
to prevent it and therefore help the mo- 
nopolist. 
In contrast, in posted-price (offer) mar- 
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Source: Smith (@1981, Purdue Research Foundation, Chart 3, p. 91). 
kets a different picture emerges in the 
case of monopoly. When the monopolists 
post prices, market behavior is more accu- 
rately captured by monopoly theory. The 
results of one experiment are in Figure 
9. This monopolist adjusts prices to mea- 
sure demand. The measurements are ac- 
curate because under the posted prices 
the effects of buyer "counterspeculation" 
seem not so severe and so demand gets 
revealed at each price.7 The monopolist 
ascertains the profit at each price, sets 
price at the monopoly level, and leaves 
it there. Volume stays at the monopoly 
level. 
Compared to the oral auction, the 
posted-offer markets tend to be mechani- 
cal. These data suggest that monopolists 
have a vested interest in having some vari- 
ant of posted-offer institutions. Of course 
the dual is that customers would prefer 
the oral double auction or the posted-bid 
institution, both of which result in lower 
prices in experimental markets. Obviously 
such results are not sufficiently well under- 
stood to serve as the sole basis for public 
utility regulation reform but they cer- 
tainly suggest some hitherto unappreci- 
ated potential for market institutions in 
this regard. 
A limited study of natural monopolies 
by Don Coursey, Isaac, and Smith (1981) 
provides new evidence that "contestable" 
markets might also provide a form of mar- 
ket control of monopoly. Ten markets 
were created, each of which had declining 
costs conditions theoretically sufficient for 
the emergence of natural monopolies. 
Supply technology at the individual firm 
7I do not intend to imply that "counterspecula- 
tion" is absent. 
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level was such that marginal and average 
costs declined for ten units, after which 
further increased supply was impossible. 
Demand price was above average cost 
through the tenth unit where it was $.12 
above the average cost of a firm producing 
ten units and $1.00 below the average cost 
of a firm producing one unit. A monopolist 
would theoretically provide six units. Co- 
operating duopolists without side pay- 
ments would provide two units each. Price 
was above marginal cost at the eleventh 
unit. The market demand was generated 
by five equal-sized but not identical buy- 
ers. Units were "sold to order" with no 
fixed cost, setup cost, or inventories. 
Four of the ten markets were supplied 
by a single monopolist. The other six had 
two potential and identical suppliers. 
Each supplier posted a price at the begin- 
ning of the period and a nonzero quantity. 
The market institution required the seller 
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TABLE 1 
PARAMETERS AND DATA FROM PROTECTED 
MONOPOLY AND CONTESTED MONOPOLY 
Parameters Period 18 of All Markets 
Protected Contested 
Monopoly Monopoly 
Monopoly Competitive (Average from (Average from 
Variable Model Model Four Markets) Six Markets) 
Price $1.12 $0 to $.12 $1.05 $.182 
Quantity 6 10 5 9.3 
Efficiency 60% 100% 49% 85.5% 
Source: Coursey, Isaac and Smith (1981). 
to sell to all buyers requesting units at the 
posted price until the posted quantity was 
exhausted, whereupon the seller could sell 
no more. The posted prices were publicly 
announced and buyers, given random ac- 
cess to the market, were free to choose 
the seller they wanted. Purchases were 
known only to the buyer and seller in- 
volved. 
The results are in Table 1. As can be 
seen, the behavior of the posted monopoly 
is modeled by the monopoly model rather 
than the competitive model. Coursey, 
Isaac, and Smith conjecture that the error 
of the model is due to buyer "counter- 
speculation." The six markets with con- 
testable monopolies were more accurately 
modeled by the competitive model. In 
contestable markets monopoly actually 
existed in all but ten of the one hundred 
six total number of periods observed. The 
monopolist changed from period to pe- 
riod, however, depending upon which po- 
tential supplier posted the lowest price. 
These results are only an initial probe 
into the behavior of contestable markets. 
Clearly the contestants have an interest 
in mechanisms which would restrict the 
quantity that each offered to the market. 
Perhaps by implementing institutions or 
practices which make the quantities sub- 
mitted public, along with the market de- 
mand function and individual sales vol- 
umes, sellers will be able to coordinate 
decisions in a tacit collusion. Obviously 
such open questions can be addressed by 
further experimentation. 
B. Fixed Supply 
Industrial organization theory has tra- 
ditionally been focused on the case of vari- 
able supply. Such focus is understandable 
because if the supply is fixed, the efficiency 
implications of monopoly are nonexistent. 
In the absence of price discrimination, a 
monopolized market with a fixed supply 
is exactly like a competitive market ac- 
cording to textbook theory. Nevertheless, 
the fixed supply case is of interest. It is 
one part (marketing the supply) in a two- 
part (determining supply) monopoly deci- 
sion process. Moreover, fixed supplies (or 
demands) and competitive bidding are 
frequently used by government to allo- 
cate public resources (e.g., oil leases) or 
to procure public goods (e.g., weapons). 
The first sealed-bid experiments with 
many bidders were conducted by Smith 
(1967). These experiments were moti- 
vated by a controversy about the market- 
ing of United States Treasury bonds. The 
Treasury uses a sealed-bid discriminative 
auction. If Q units are to be sold, they 
are sold to the Q highest bidders at a price 
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equal to the bid. Critics of the Treasury 
believed that a sealed-bid one-price auc- 
tion would generate more money. In the 
one-price auction the Q units are sold to 
the Q highest bidders, but all bidders 
would pay the same price and this price 
would equal the Qth highest bid or the 
(Q + 1)th highest depending upon the 
rules. A more recent problem regarding 
methods of allocating the right to land at 
four of the nation's busiest airports again 
focused research on the properties of 
these two type of auctions (Grether, Isaac, 
and Plott, 1981). 
Smith examined a market in which lot- 
teries were auctioned. Meyer W. Belovicz 
(1979), using this same type of market, ex- 
plored extensively the principal hypothe- 
sis which emerged from Smith that the 
relative revenue-generating capabilities 
of the two auction institutions depended 
critically upon the magnitude of excess 
demand. The results emerging from that 
study are mixed. 
The methodology was changed in Gary 
J. Miller and Plott (forthcoming) and in 
James C. Cox, Smith, and James M. Walker 
(1981) to one in which the personal value 
of the object was known with certainty 
but the value to other bidders was un- 
known. In the G. J. Miller and Plott study, 
bidders could purchase more than one 
unit, aggregate demand was stationary for 
many periods (but subject to an occasional 
shift), and individual demands were ro- 
tated each period in a manner which pre- 
served aggregate demand but changed 
each individual demand. In the latter, 
bidders could purchase only one unit, 
redemption values were generated 
randomly each period, and only the 
discriminative auction was studied. 
Both of these studies provide support 
for Nash equilibrium bidding models 
when there are several (three or four) bid- 
ders; that is, an equilibrium identified as 
one in which each individual is optimizing 
given the actions of every other individ- 
ual. The G. J. Miller and Plott study sug- 
gests that the relative revenue-generating 
capabilities of the two types of auctions 
depend upon demand elasticity with dis- 
criminative auctions generating more rev- 
enue when demand is relatively inelastic 
and one-price auctions generating more 
revenue when demand is relatively elas- 
tic. In part, this is due to the weight of 
"disequilibrium" auctions. After conver- 
gence takes place, they generate about 
the same revenue. These results are repli- 
cated in the study by Grether, Isaac, and 
Plott (1981). 
Figure 10 taken from G. J. Miller and 
Plott (forthcoming) illustrates the point. 
The limit price function is the curve LOL. 
The Nash equilibrium bidding curve is the 
line POL for the discriminative auction 
and it is LOL for the one-price auction 
when there is some uncertainty. The ac- 
tual bids for the first period under a dis- 
criminative auction are as shown by dd. 
Under one-price auctions the distribution 
of bids is about the same for the first pe- 
riod. Under the one-price auction the dis- 
tribution of bids approaches the limit 
price function LOL after several periods 
so the price is P. The distribution of ac- 
tual bids under the discriminative auction 
in the tenth period is shown. Since the 
area A is greater than the area B, the reve- 
nue under the discriminative auction is 
greater in this period. 
Single unit auctions have been the sub- 
ject of several papers. The market struc- 
ture differs from the studies above in that 
individual valuations are drawn at random 
each period so that the market demand 
as well as individual demands are not sta- 
tionary. The market institutions examined 
are the English auction, the Dutch auc- 
tion,8 first price sealed-bid auction, and 
the second price sealed-bid auction. Theo- 
8 Prices start high and move downward in fixed 
intervals. The bidder who first stops the downward 
price movement purchases the object at the price. 
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Source: Miller and Plott, forthcoming. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Tue, 25 Feb 2014 18:38:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Plott: Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics 1507 
retically (Nash bidding hypothesis) the En- 
glish and the second price auction are 
equivalent and the Dutch and the first 
price auction are equivalent in terms of 
prices and efficiency. Many experiments 
with these auctions (Vicki M. Coppinger, 
Smith, and Jon A. Titus, 1980; Cox, Bruce 
Roberson, and Smith, forthcoming) indi- 
cate that the English and second price 
auctions behave substantially the same, 
and prices and efficiencies of these two 
exceed those of the other two. The Dutch 
and first price auction are not the same, 
with prices and efficiency of the latter 
greater. Cox, Roberson, and Smith are 
able to reject the hypothesis of Nash equi- 
librium behavior with identical utility 
functions and have been exploring the ap- 
plications of models with variable risk 
preferences. 
The exploration of sealed-bid institu- 
tions is initiated along a different dimen- 
sion by Thomas R. Palfrey (1981; forth- 
coming). The question is whether a 
monopolist who has several different ob- 
jects to sell by a first price sealed-bid auc- 
tion is better off by selling them separately 
or by bundling them together and selling 
the packages. With few bidders, bundling 
is profitable, but as the number of bidders 
increases, the advantage of bundling over 
separate auctions decreases. 
IV. Oligopoly 
A polar case of cartel theory is monop- 
oly, so in a sense the results of a perfectly 
functioning cartel were reviewed in the 
previous section. A principal conclusion 
was that the performance of a monopoly 
(perfect cartel) market is substantially af- 
fected by the marketing institutions. Be- 
cause this result carries over so strongly 
to the case of "imperfect" cartels, the re- 
view is organized according to the market 
institutions as opposed to other variables 
such as number of agents in the market, 
the size of agents, or demand elasticity. 
A. Oral Auction Markets 
Within oral auction markets two types 
of situations have been studied: an "obvi- 
ous" harmony of interest and explicit con- 
spiracy. Market participants almost always 
recognize a harmony of interest and this 
recognition can be identified in the mar- 
ket signals which occur almost constantly 
in oral double auctions. After a contract, 
when the market is open for bids or offers, 
the bidding will sometimes start with a 
clearly unacceptable bid or offer (e.g., a 
bid of one cent or something far below 
any previously accepted price, or an offer 
from two to ten times higher than any 
previously accepted price). Such bids (of- 
fers) are often followed by similar bids (of- 
fers) from other buyers (sellers) who are 
indicating a willingness to keep offers low 
(high). When this happens, the other side 
of the market tends not to be passive. Such 
"outrageous" terms are frequently an- 
swered by equally ridiculous terms from 
the other side which is indicating that it 
too has that strategy available. Even when 
there is no answer, the terms of such high 
bids or offers are not accepted, as the 
other side simply waits (counterspecu- 
lates). Competition slowly works the terms 
into the previously accepted range. Sig- 
nals such as these never seem to work to 
affect prices in the double auction institu- 
tion or if they do the effectiveness is not 
immediately obvious. 
In some experiments a harmony of in- 
terest is easily recognizable. In studies by 
R. M. Miller, Plott, and Smith (1977); 
F. Williams (1973); and Hoffman and Plott 
(1981) the markets had two speculators 
who could purchase units in one period 
(period A) and sell them in the next period 
(period B). These two individuals were the 
only agents who had the ability to buy 
units and carry them forward. They had 
a clear interest in maintaining a low price 
in period A and a high price in period 
B. In spite of this recognizable interest 
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and the fact that only two agents had such 
powers, the market behavior is modeled 
well by an intertemporal competitive 
equilibrium. 
The point is made somewhat more 
forcefully in Plott and Uhl (1981). In these 
markets four middlemen had the capacity 
to buy in one market in which they were 
the only buyers and sell in a physically 
separated market in which they were the 
only sellers. Unlike the speculation experi- 
ments in which all participants heard all 
bids, offers, and contracts, in the Plott and 
Uhl markets the initial sellers were one 
group of people who saw the action in 
the primary market and the final purchas- 
ers were a different group of people who 
saw only the action in the secondary mar- 
ket which was physically removed from 
the first. Both the harmony of interest and 
the collective power of the middlemen 
were obvious, but explicit conspiracy was 
not possible since middlemen were never 
allowed to speak directly to each other. 
Nevertheless, the competitive model fits 
the data closely.9 
In two studies, focal points were given 
the opportunity to operate as collusive de- 
vices. In R. Mark Isaac and Plott (1981b) 
and in Smith and A. W. Williams (1981b) 
price ceilings (floors) were imposed 
slightly above (below) the equilibrium. A 
theory is sometimes advanced (Frederic 
M. Scherer, 1970, pp. 179-82) that such 
controls act as a focal point and thereby 
facilitate tacit collusion. In the oral double 
auction markets reported in these studies 
there is absolutely no support at all for 
the theory that nonbinding controls oper- 
ate that way. If anything, the opposite is 
true. A ceiling (floor) that is nonbinding 
according to competitive theory tends to 
lower (increase) prices. 
Private, pre-period meetings by one 
side of the market were studied by Isaac 
and Plott (1981a) as a facilitating practice 
under the oral double auction institution. 
Four sellers (buyers) were allowed to talk 
freely between periods, while the buyers 
(sellers) left the room to get the next peri- 
od's demand (cost) functions. Side pay- 
ments and profit sharing were not allowed 
and discussions of such schemes were pro- 
hibited. 
The study asked the following ques- 
tions: Do traders discuss collusion when 
given the opportunity? Can the traders 
formulate some sort of agreement? Once 
formulated, do they stick to it? Can the 
consequences of the conspiracy be de- 
tected in the market performance? 
The answer to the first two questions 
is yes. These traders discussed conspiracy 
almost immediately and they had no diffi- 
culty in articulating an agreement. The 
answers to the second two are not without 
qualification. Data in Figure 11 provide 
a comparison with the oral double auction 
when no collusion is present (the first 
three experiments, I.P.I, I.P.II, and I.P.III) 
with those in which there is a seller's con- 
spiracy (the fourth and fifth indexed as I 
and II) and a buyer's conspiracy (the sixth 
and seventh indexed as III and IV). The 
top charts are the average prices each pe- 
riod. The middle charts are the per period 
volumes, and the bottom charts are the 
efficiencies. 
In order to see the effects, it is important 
to notice the near monotone convergence 
of all three measures in the first three non- 
conspiratorial markets. Prices, volume, 
and efficiency-all three move monotoni- 
cally to the competitive equilibrium lev- 
els. This does not happen in the conspiracy 
markets. In each of the four experiments 
with conspiracy, with the possible excep- 
tion of experiment III, at least one of these 
9 In still another study (Plott and Louis L. Wilde, 
forthcoming) sellers as a group (four sellers) knew 
they could collectively increase demand in the same 
sense that physicians, automobile mechanics, and 
other professionals can influence demand. The data 
give no support at all for collusion models. 
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Source: Isaac and Plott (1981a, Figure 2, p. 10) 
measures exhibits some erratic behavior 
in the sense of a "pronounced" movement 
away from competitive equilibrium. In 
this sense the conspiracy might be detect- 
able from market data, but Experiment 
III indicates the difficulty. Notice in ex- 
periment III there is a strong tendency 
toward the competitive levels even 
though there is an active conspiracy. 
Figure 12 will help explain what is hap- 
pening. Shown there is the sequence of 
bids, offers, and contracts from experi- 
ment III. This experiment involved the 
dramatic reduction in prices in period 4 
as a result of a successful buyer's conspir- 
acy. 
Some general discussion began after period 3. 
Note that, unlike period 3, the buyers in period 
4 did not rush to accept high seller offers. In 
period 3, five of the first six trades were offers 
between 83 cents and 88 cents. In period 4, 
no offers were accepted until they reached 73 
cents. In period 5, the tenth bid was at 72 cents. 
Between periods 5 and 6 the [buyers]'0 agreed 
to try to hold the price at 71 cents. In period 
6, the first twenty-seven bids were all either 
at 70 cents or 71 cents, with several intervening 
offers at 72 cents ignored. The twenty-eighth 
bid broke the agreement, and there were ten 
immediate trades at 72 cents [Isaac and Plott, 
1981a, p. 18]. 
Of particular interest in this context are 
the high offers in period 5. These are inter- 
preted as signals by sellers as an attempt 
to get other sellers to hold out. Fre- 
quently, however, they are made by sell- 
ers who have already sold and now have 
only high cost units which they do not 
expect to sell. The cost of signaling to 
them is low. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the nonconspirators are not simply passive 
is obvious. 
The difficulty these conspirators have in 
substantially affecting market conduct 
10 This corrects an error in the original paper (Isaac 
and Plott, 1981a) in which the word "sellers" was 
used instead of the correct word, "buyers." 
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seems to be related to the market institu- 
tional environment. As the Smith results 
reviewed above demonstrate, even a per- 
fect conspiracy (monopoly) has difficulty 
in the double auction. When one adds this 
property of auction markets to the fact 
that oligopolists can have difficulty in 
achieving coordination even under the 
most favorable conditions, perhaps it is 
not surprising that the market structure 
in the Isaac and Plott experiments (four 
buyers and four sellers) would make suc- 
cessful conspiracy difficult. 
B. Privately Negotiated Prices 
The only nonconspiratorial oligopoly 
markets that have been studied experi- 
mentally in which prices are privately 
negotiated are those in the Grether and 
Plott (1981) study. In these markets de- 
mand was relatively inelastic. The supply 
condition was one of excess capacity at a 
constant cost over the relevant ranges. 
The market contained several similarly 
sized buyers, two large sellers, and two 
very small sellers. No entry was possible. 
All contracts were negotiated and exe- 
cuted privately by telephone. 
In these markets each buyer and seller 
was located in a private office. Buyers had 
the phone numbers of sellers but not other 
buyers, and sellers had the phone num- 
bers of buyers and not other sellers. Thus 
there was no possibility of conspiracy. In 
addition, phone calls were privately moni- 
tored through a master switchboard in a 
secretarial pool as a further control. Sub- 
jects were told that side payments or dis- 
cussions of side payments in any form (e.g., 
physical threats) were prohibited and that 
if any were detected, the experiment 
would be terminated immediately. 
In all other respects these markets were 
similar to those conducted under oral auc- 
tion institutions. The time periods were 
longer (ten to fifteen minutes). As might 
be expected, the volume in a telephone 
market moves more slowly because of the 
time involved with dialing, negotiating, 
etc. 
Results typical of these experiments are 
shown in Figure 6. Variance in price is 
high at first but begins to shrink over time. 
Prices, as can be seen, hang slightly above 
the competitive equilibrium. Neverthe- 
less, the market behavior is still more 
closely approximated by the competitive 
equilibrium model than any other "stan- 
dard" theory. 
Conspiracy was allowed in a study by 
Selten (1970). Negotiations took place pri- 
vately in booths. The four sellers each 
made supply quantity decisions before a 
period opened. The number of buyers var- 
ied between nine and twelve in the ten 
markets studied. Side payments, cartels, 
buyer and/or seller conversations, futures 
contracts, etc. were all permitted since 
one of the purposes was to see what prac- 
tices emerged from the marketplace. Con- 
vergence to the competitive equilibrium 
can be read into many of the price pat- 
terns but abrupt movements away from 
equilibrium exist. On average the results 
are the competitive equilibrium. 
C. Posted Prices 
The posted-price institution has been 
used in almost all oligopoly experiments. 
The practice was (perhaps inadvertently) 
introduced by Hoggatt (1959) and by Four- 
aker and Siegel (1963). In the Fouraker 
and Siegel experiments each subject seller 
was given a profit table indicating profits 
as a function of own price and the compet- 
itor's price. Hoggatt used a mathematical 
demand function to determine revenues. 
In both cases the sellers, during a period, 
chose only a single price and the decision 
was irrevocable. Since a fixed revenue 
function or profit function was provided, 
the procedures implicitly assumed that 
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TABLE 2 
FOURAKER AND SIEGEL PROFIT TABLE 
Profit When Profit When Loss When I 
Price I Have the I Am Tied Have the 
Bid Lower Price for Low Price Higher Price 
$0.5 $.13 $.00 $ - 
1.0 .35 .11 -.25 
1.5 .53 .20 -.25 
2.0 .67 .27 -.25 
2.5 .77 .32 -.25 
3.0 .83 .35 -.25 
3.5 .85 .36 -.25 
4.0 .83 .35 -.25 
4.5 .77 .32 -.25 
5.0 .27 -.25 
Source: Murphy (1966, Item 1, p. 308). 
buyers do not counterspeculate and there- 
fore behave "passively" as under the 
posted-price institution. Thus, the results 
seem to be interpreted most appropri- 
ately within that classification. 
Two different demand structures were 
used in these early experiments. In one 
series of experiments Fouraker and Siegel 
used a homogeneous product in the sense 
that a price above a competitor's resulted 
in a small loss. This reflects a primary in- 
terest of the experimenters in the Ber- 
trand model of price determination as op- 
posed to Cournot.11 On the other hand, 
Hoggatt used individual demand func- 
tions for sellers which responded nega- 
tively if a competitor lowered prices, but 
volume for the high price seller did not 
adjust discontinuously to zero. Sauermann 
and Selten used a profit table based on 
quantity decisions. Both reflect an interest 
in the Cournot model. Fouraker and Sie- 
gel also conducted a series of experiments 
in which subjects each chose a quantity. 
Once the total quantity supplied was 
known, the experimenter would choose 
a price according to a predetermined de- 
mand schedule. All subjects then sold 
their chosen quantity at this price. The 
discussion below reviews the homoge- 
neous case first. 
In the Fouraker and Siegel "homoge- 
neous commodity" design each competi- 
tor is given the profit table shown as Table 
2 which is held constant for the duration 
of several periods. Use of a profit table 
implies that the market demand function 
is known with certainty (unlike experi- 
ments discussed above). Prices above a 
competitor's price result in no sales and 
a small loss. This property leads to the in- 
terpretation that the commodity is homo- 
geneous. Cost conditions are such that 
zero profits were earned at the competi- 
tive equilibrium as shown. (In a feature 
added by James L. Murphy, 1966, price 
levels below this involved a loss for all 
agents.) The economic interpretation 
would be one of no rents, and one conse- 
quence of this lack of "producer surplus" 
is that prices must necessarily approach 
the competitive equilibrium from above. 
An important basic economic condition of 
" The Bertrand model assumes all buyers will 
instantaneously shift to the lowest priced seller so 
unilateral price changes induce substantial volume 
shifts among competitors. The Cournot model as- 
sumes that all competitors necessarily charge the 
same price but a price cutter absorbs all new market 
volume induced by overall lower prices (Lester Tel- 
ser, 1972, pp. 152-53). 
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these experiments was the symmetry of 
the payoff functions, thus implying some- 
thing about similarity of costs (for the ho- 
mogeneous product experiment the inter- 
pretation would be that all costs are 
constant at zero). Market structures were 
primarily duopolies but triopolies were 
also studied. 
The primarily institutional variable 
aside from the posted price, involved the 
amount of knowledge available to agents. 
Under the Fouraker and Siegel complete 
information, the public information was 
that all agents knew all past price choices 
and profits of all other agents. In the in- 
complete information condition, the pub- 
lic information was that profits were un- 
known and an agent only knew at the end 
of a period whether his price was higher 
or lower than the competitor's. 
If one uses as the market price the low- 
est price in the market (the price at which 
all trades takes place) then Fouraker and 
Siegel discovered a strong tendency for 
prices to converge toward the competi- 
tive equilibrium. In the case of incomplete 
information by the fourteenth period the 
competitive equilibrium price prevailed 
in eleven of seventeen markets and was 
at the neighboring price (the price nearest 
the competitive equilibrium) in six other 
cases. In the remaining experiment, the 
price was closer to the competitive equi- 
librium than to the joint maximum. 
The complete information markets 
were characterized by a higher variance 
in behavior. Six of these markets were at 
the competitive equilibrium by the four- 
teenth period. Three more were at the 
neighboring price. Four were exactly mid- 
way between the competitive price and 
the joint maximum, and the other four 
were either at the joint maximum (two) 
or at the neighboring price (two). The ad- 
ditional information provided in this mar- 
ket setting tended to facilitate collusive 
behavior. Notice that the importance of 
the information is connected in some way 
to the market setting because public infor- 
mation (other than profits) in the oral auc- 
tion facilitates no collusion at all. 
Fouraker and Siegel also examined tri- 
opoly. All of the eleven markets operating 
under incomplete information converged 
by the fourteenth period to the competi- 
tive equilibrium. All but one of the ten 
markets operating under complete infor- 
mation also converged to the competitive 
equilibrium. Thus, in these experiments 
the number of sellers was an important 
variable when information was complete. 
In a study by James L. Murphy (1966) 
a similar decay process was observed in 
duopolies operating under the incomplete 
information condition. In general, how- 
ever, he found the decay process to be 
slower with prices tending to hang some- 
what higher above the competitive equi- 
librium than in the Fouraker and Siegel 
experiments. By the fourteenth period, 
thirteen of seventeen duopoly markets 
were closer to the competitive equilib- 
rium than to the joint maximum. The 
Murphy markets continued ten periods 
beyond the fourteenth period where the 
Fouraker and Siegel markets stopped. At 
the end of the twenty-fourth period, 
eleven of the seventeen markets were 
closer to the competitive equilibrium than 
the joint maximum and five were exactly 
at the joint maximum. The variance across 
periods within markets decreased. Thus 
markets either converged to the joint 
maximum or the competitive equilibrium, 
given more time, and the additional time 
enhanced the tendency to the former. 
The Murphy experiments involved 
three changes from the Fouraker and Sie- 
gel experiments. More price choices were 
available. Prices below the competitive 
equilibrium were possible with losses re- 
sulting in prices in that range and of 
course the experimenter and subject pools 
differed. Murphy conducted only incom- 
plete information markets with his own 
payoff charts. By comparing the rate of 
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cooperation with Fouraker and Siegel, he 
concluded that the threat of losses ac- 
counts for the higher rate. This conclusion 
is somewhat premature without a con- 
trolled experiment using the Fouraker 
and Siegel payoffs along with the Murphy 
payoff in the same subject pool and design. 
Rates of cooperation may well differ 
slightly from subject pool to subject pool 
and that might account for the differences 
with Fouraker and Siegel. Convergence 
to the joint maximum was not monotone. 
Instead, almost all of the duopolies experi- 
enced the decay to the competitive equi- 
librium at first and then, after several peri- 
ods, prices began to drift upwards for 
those that ultimately converged to the 
joint maximum. 
Presumably this "cooperative" phe- 
nomenon in duopolies operating under 
these conditions is facilitated by many tri- 
als and experience. The latter was ex- 
plored extensively by Rolf Stoecker (1980) 
within the same parametric environment 
as Murphy but with complete informa- 
tion. Rather than many periods of a single 
market, Stoecker allowed individuals to 
obtain experience from different markets 
of ten periods each. Thirty-seven out of 
fifty duopoly markets managed substantial 
cooperation (at or near the joint maxi- 
mum). None of the remainder exhibited 
the property of monotonic convergence 
to the competitive equilibrium. Jumps of 
price were common. 
The Stoecker experiments provide new 
insights into the nature and possibility of 
tacit collusion. Nineteen of the thirty- 
seven markets which attained the coordi- 
nated equilibrium near the joint maxi- 
mum did so with no signals or "learning." 
It occurred with the first price choice. 
Both competitors chose the joint maxi- 
mum, and for the most part the systems 
stayed there. This behavior was prevalent 
among duopolists with previous experi- 
ence. Thus, in this context, in which the 
harmony of interest could be clearly ascer- 
tained with no room for ambiguity or con- 
fusion, some duopolies needed no means 
of communicating intentions at all. Tacit 
collusion occurred immediately. For a 
subset (eighteen) of these fifty duopolies 
the joint maximum was not the individual 
maximum given equal prices. Of these, 
thirteen achieved stable equilibrium near 
the joint maximum and of the thirteen 
there were four which attained the equi- 
librium with the first move. Since these 
duopolists had twenty prices to choose 
from, it would be difficult to ascribe these 
coordinated actions to chance. 
In Fouraker and Siegel, and in Stoecker 
both of the basic economic conditions of 
profit function symmetry (Stoecker stud- 
ied two different types of asymmetry) and 
the market structure (two, three, and five 
agents) were examined. Symmetry results 
in high market prices. Presumably this is 
because coordination is easier-the ac- 
tions of the other agents can be more 
clearly understood and there can be no 
disagreement over the joint strategies. If 
both are to charge the same price, a 
unique Pareto optimum exists. An in- 
crease in the number of firms almost al- 
ways results in a convergence of price to 
levels near the competitive equilibrium. 
However, a slight upward bias relative to 
the competitive equilibrium even when 
the number of firms is "large," appears 
to be part of the general properties of the 
posted-price institution. 
Fouraker and Siegel conducted another 
series of experiments which can be inter- 
preted as a case of nonhomogeneous 
products.12 In these markets, sellers each 
12The Fouraker-Siegel subjects saw only profits ex- 
pressed on tables as a function of the two partici- 
pants' quantity choices. While Fouraker and Siegel 
generated these functions from a market demand 
with a homogeneous product and no costs, the func- 
tions themselves are consistent with other economic 
environments. In particular, one can generate these 
same profit functions from properly selected de- 
mand functions for nonhomogeneous products and 
properly selected cost functions. Furthermore, in the 
transformed environment, choice of quantity is 
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determined a quantity interpreted as the 
number of units to be offered for sale. 
After all decisions were collected by the 
experimenter, the quantities were an- 
nounced and each subject could deter- 
mine the profits from a prepared table. 
In the complete information case, com- 
petitors knew all previous quantity 
choices and profits of each other. In the 
incomplete information condition all pre- 
vious quantity decisions of all participants 
were known to all, but each seller knew 
only his/her own profits. The fact that 
quantity decisions were known under the 
incomplete information condition induces 
an element of noncomparability between 
the homogeneous product case reviewed 
above in which price decisions were made 
and each competitor knew only who had 
the lowest price and not the price magni- 
tude. 
The results at the fourteenth period are 
summarized in Figure 13. Each market 
is categorized according to the model 
which most accurately predicts total mar- 
ket volume. As can be seen, the accuracy 
of the joint maximization or cartel model 
decreases with an increase in number of 
agents and also a reduction of information 
about the other agents' actions. Interest- 
ingly, the Cournot model as opposed to 
the competitive model seems to be most 
accurate in this "nonhomogeneous com- 
modity" case. In the homogeneous com- 
modity experiments the two models could 
not be given independent interpretations. 
Here they can and the Cournot model 
picks up much of the data. Whether this 
is the natural "upward bias" of the posted 
prices or an actual manifestation of the 
Nash equilibrium principle is still an open 
question. 
The work of James W. Friedman (1963, 
1969, 1970), Hoggatt (1959, 1967) and 
F. T. Dolbear, et al. (1968) has extended 
the posted-price research in several direc- 
tions. In these markets, products are in 
a formal sense no longer homogeneous. 
Recall, in the Fouraker and Siegel setting, 
prices higher than a competitor's result 
in a loss to the competitor with the higher 
price. Presumably this reflects the idea 
that sellers with the highest price make 
no sales and, to the extent that costs are 
incurred, must suffer a loss. In the experi- 
ments to be discussed, the competitor 
with the highest price can still make some 
profit but not as much as would be the 
case if the price were equal to or below 
the other(s). As a result of this difference 
in market conditions the information con- 
ditions can be altered. Perfect information 
means that all profit functions and past 
price choices are known. Incomplete in- 
formation means that all past prices (or 
quantities, as appropriate) are known but 
only an agent's own profit functions are 
known. 
The findings are best represented in the 
recent book by Friedman and Hoggatt 
(1980) which describes the results of sev- 
eral oligopolistic markets under varying 
parametric information conditions and 
subject experience. Relative to other ex- 
periments these are exceptionally compli- 
cated because subjects made production 
and inventory decisions along with price 
decisions. Subjects gained experience as 
in Stoecker by participating in a series of 
different markets over a long period of 
time. In addition to more refined models 
of individual decisions, two basic market 
models are compared: the joint maximum 
model and the Cournot equilibrium. The 
competitive equilibria where price equals 
marginal cost are not examined. Of 
course, the Cournot equilibrium prices 
are above these prices. 
Hoggatt and Friedman devote much ef- 
fort to developing a model of individual 
behavior. The model developed, which 
has considerable support, assumes the in- 
equivalent to choice of price. Therefore, the Four- 
aker and Siegel experiments can be interpreted as 
a case of price posting for a nonhomogeneous com- 
modity. 
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dividual develops estimates of the other 
agent's pricing decisions by an extrapola- 
tion of previous decisions. The individual 
then optimizes against that estimate. The 
resulting market equilibria are reinforcing 
in a statistical sense. Cournot behavior in 
this sense is a good first approximation of 
individual behavior when tacit collusion 
is absent. 
If the markets are characterized by per- 
fect information and symmetric profit 
functions, the joint maximum is a good 
predictor for markets with up to four sell- 
ers. For the market with six sellers, prices 
dropped substantially to the Cournot 
equilibrium or just above it. If the symme- 
try is dropped or if perfect information 
is dropped,13 the number of sellers be- 
13Information in Dolbear, et al. (1968) did not have 
a measurable effect. Subsequent experiments sug- 
gest that the payoffs used in this experiment were 
so small (five cents difference in profits between 
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comes a very important treatment varia- 
ble in that an increase in the number de- 
stroys the accuracy of the joint maximum 
model. In the duopoly markets, significant 
(but less than perfect) cooperation occurs 
but, with an increase in the number of 
firms, it vanishes almost completely and 
the Cournot model is very accurate by 
comparison. 
Friedman and Hoggatt conjecture what 
Stoecker convincingly demonstrates, that 
experience makes a difference. "New and 
inexperienced faces" can cause market 
prices to deteriorate. 
Hoggatt, Friedman, and Shlomo Gill 
(1976), and Friedman and Hoggatt (1980) 
provide the only attempts to model the 
signaling phenomenon. In part, signals are 
viewed as attention getting devices. Most 
of the work is an attempt to identify a 
signal as something distinct buried in the 
masses of data of the ordinary searching 
and competing price decisions. Within the 
posted-price institution high or low prices 
have an immediate effect on profits, so 
as one might expect, signals occur rarely, 
relative to other decisions. Signals are 
identified as a type of "pulse" in which 
an abrupt change of behavior occurs for 
a brief period (a sudden large price in- 
crease or decrease) followed by a return 
to the original levels. Friedman and Hog- 
gatt have attempted to develop models 
which will relate this activity to overall 
price changes and/or price levels. As of 
this writing they have a reasonable char- 
acterization of the phenomenon but feel 
it happens so infrequently in their data 
that the implications cannot be ascer- 
tained. 
Thus, for the posted-price institution a 
pattern is emerging. The institution seems 
to foster higher prices in general. Further- 
more, under appropriate basic economic 
conditions and market structures, it can 
foster tacit collusion in the sense that the 
joint maximizing model is an accurate pre- 
dictor of pricing patterns. 
If the market institution is the posted 
price as opposed to the oral double auc- 
tion, and the market structure is duopoly, 
a completely different picture of conspir- 
acy emerges. Friedman (1967, 1970) stud- 
ied posted prices of duopolies with 
asymmetric payoff functions. Perfect in- 
formation existed in the sense that each 
competitor knew all previous price 
choices and payoffs (up to a scalar transfor- 
mation on occasion). Competitors were al- 
lowed to transmit two written messages 
before privately making a price decision. 
These messages were made in sequence 
with the same individual initiating contact 
for each of up to twenty-five periods (al- 
though most were from six to fourteen). 
In his data, collusive agreements were at- 
tained in over 75 percent of all decisions 
made, and of the collusive agreements, 75 
percent were Pareto optimal relative to 
the pair (no side payments were allowed). 
The ability to make such agreements in- 
creases with experience. Once a collusive 
agreement has been attained and success- 
fully implemented in choice behavior for 
one time, the probability of another suc- 
cessful agreement is .96. 
An attempt to study collusion under the 
posted-price institution is also found in 
Selten and Claus C. Berg (1970). Side pay- 
ments were possible with some risk that 
the payments would not be made. Each 
seller had the ability to stop the continu- 
ous time in these markets in order to make 
a price change. Other sellers were aware 
of price changes and could respond imme- 
diately. Collusive arrangements emerged, 
but not always. 
Conspiracy does have implications for 
market performance. Perhaps this is no 
surprise to those who have observed in- 
Cournot equilibrium and monopoly) that the influ- 
ence of any variables would be hard to detect. Never- 
theless, the data tend to be very close and just above 
the Cournot equilibrium and the qualitative influ- 
ence of other variables is consistent with those of 
later studies. 
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dustry for years but these studies demon- 
strate the truth of the proposition for those 
who have not had the benefit of such ob- 
servation or believe that the "competitive 
drive to defect" is so strong that collusion 
is impossible. Experiments illustrate that 
performance is strongly influenced by 
both market structure and the market in- 
stitutional environment. 
D. Markets with Advance Notification 
and Price Protection 
The recent actions taken by the Fed- 
eral Trade Commission14 have drawn at- 
tention to the market institution in the 
antiknock compound industry.15 Four in- 
dustrial practices were in dispute. First, 
customers were assured of a thirty-day ad- 
vance notice of price changes (increases). 
Secondly, prices were quoted in terms of 
delivered prices with the same price pre- 
vailing regardless of transportation costs. 
The last two were in contracts which typi- 
cally included a "price protection" clause 
which guarantees (i) that the seller will 
sell to no one at a price less than the price 
quoted the buyer and (ii) the seller will 
meet any lower price in the market or 
release the buyer from the contract. 
The market structure is characterized 
by two large sellers of equal size (approxi- 
mately 35 percent of the market each) and 
two small sellers of about equal size. A 
long-run declining demand (due to a re- 
duction in lead use in gasoline) and exist- 
ing excess capacity discourages entry. 
Eight large buyers account for about 60 
percent of the sales and many very small 
buyers account for the rest. 
Grether and Plott (1981) have explored 
markets with these properties. Each agent 
was assigned an office. Sellers were able 
to post prices by means of a digital elec- 
tronic display system such that price an- 
nouncements were made known immedi- 
ately to all market agents. Orders were 
placed through the telephone system. 
Price increases required advance notice 
and all transactions were made at adver- 
tised prices (the buyer protection clause 
which precludes all discounts). The mar- 
ket structure was as described above with 
the market demand and supply functions 
as shown in Figure 14. 
The major conclusion of this study is 
that these practices and market structure 
cause prices to be above those that would 
otherwise exist if either variable were ap- 
propriately changed. Figure 14 gives the 
averages prices during each of seventeen 
trading periods. Market institutions were 
a simple telephone market during the first 
twelve periods. As can be seen, the prices 
begin to decay toward the competitive 
equilibrium. The four disputed practices 
were imposed beginning in period 13 and 
remained through period 15. As can be 
seen, prices jump immediately to near 
those which exist at the Cournot equilib- 
rium. When the practices were removed 
(periods 16 and 17) prices immediately 
fell. These data are representative of the 
pattern of findings from ten experimental 
markets. 
The theoretical explanation of this phe- 
nomenon has some support. Advance no- 
tice given sufficiently in advance of the 
deadline for advance notification provides 
a signal to other sellers. If the notice in- 
volves a price sufficiently far in the future, 
it induces no current business loss. Only 
a single price is involved, so the signal is 
uncomplicated with minimal dimensions 
over which disagreement can occur. 
Other sellers know that if they do not in- 
crease prices before the deadline, the 
original firm will rescind the proposed 
price increase. Thus other sellers do not 
have the option of "underselling" and ac- 
quiring a larger market share. The Nash 
14 The Federal Trade Commission complaint 
against Ethyl, DuPont, PPG and Nalco Chemical 
Company (Ethyl Corporation, et al. FTC Docket No. 
9128. Complaint issued May 31, 1979). 
15 The product is added to gasoline by refiners to 
reduce knock and raise gasoline octane rating. 
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strategy for such firms is simply to match 
the proposed price if a uniform industry 
price at the higher level will increase the 
firm's profits and do nothing otherwise. 
On the downside, due to the homoge- 
neous nature of the product, if not the 
buyer's protection, price cuts will be 
matched, so the incentive to cut prices 
depends upon the anticipated share of de- 
mand increase due to lower price levels. 
This model predicts that prices will cer- 
tainly be at Cournot levels if not higher. 
These institutions seem to have an effect 
on buyers similar to the posted-price insti- 
tutions. Buyers do not anticipate discounts 
because the institutions prevent them. 
Furthermore, since any price concessions 
must be offered to all, buyers can see that 
price concessions can be costly to the 
seller and thus have less expectation of 
winning them. As a result, the buyers 
seem to have less "counterspeculation" 
than in, say, the telephone markets alone. 
Thus these institutions appear to remove 
one source of buyer pressure for reduced 
prices while at the same time easing the 
problem of price coordination for the 
seller and eliminating the advantages of 
price cuts. 
V. Defense of Experiments 
Many of the studies reviewed above 
were designed and executed to answer 
reasonably specific questions related pri- 
marily to basic science. Sometimes ap- 
plied scientists dismiss the experimental 
results and methods as being irrelevant 
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and inapplicable. Needless to say, most 
questions cannot be answered by applying 
experimental methods. The theme of this 
section is on the art of posing questions 
which can. 
The relevance of experimental methods 
rests on the proposition that laboratory 
markets are "real" markets in the sense 
that principles of economics apply there 
as well as elsewhere. Real people pursue 
real profits within the context of real rules. 
The simplicity of laboratory markets in 
comparison with naturally occurring mar- 
kets must not be confused with questions 
about their reality as markets.16 
If the reality of laboratory markets as 
markets is accepted, then the art of posing 
questions rests on an ability to make the 
study of simple special cases relevant to 
an understanding of the complex. General 
theories and models by definition apply 
to all special cases. Therefore, general the- 
ories and models should be expected to 
work in the special cases of laboratory 
markets. As models fail to capture what 
is observed in the special cases, they can 
be modified or rejected in light of experi- 
ence. The relevance of experimental 
methods is thereby established. 
Several different research strategies are 
apparent in the research reviewed in this 
paper but five will be identified here. 
1. Theory Rejection. A model may be 
so poor at capturing observed behavior 
that it may be best to consider it no further 
or to use it even if no alternative model 
is available. The original experiments by 
Smith could be viewed as a potential basis 
for rejecting the ideas of demand and sup- 
ply. If the model had not been at all accu- 
rate when applied to a simple market de- 
signed explicitly to give the model its 
"best chance," if, for example, the data 
were rectangularly distributed over the 
trading range in all periods, then it could 
be rejected as capturing none of the phe- 
nomena. However, the model worked ex- 
traordinarily well and as a result the origi- 
nal experiments were essentially ignored 
by the economics profession. Those who 
had a strong belief in principles of demand 
and supply said the results were "obvi- 
ous." Critics of demand and supply dis- 
missed the results saying that the markets 
were "rigged" so that demand and supply 
would work. When the approach is one 
of "model rejection," negative results in- 
stead of positive results are "interest- 
ing." 
2. Theory Competition. In most cases 
competing models exist and existing data 
are not an adequate basis for rejecting one 
in favor of the other. The idea, then, is 
to create simple laboratory markets which 
are special cases of markets in which the 
models are generally applied. The experi- 
ments will, hopefully, indicate which is 
more accurate in the simple cases. While 
relative accuracy in a simple case does not 
prove that the model will continue to be 
relatively accurate when applied to the 
complex case, it does provide some experi- 
ences with the models. More importantly, 
it places the burden of proof squarely on 
those who continue to advocate the "los- 
ing" model to establish why the model 
they prefer would do relatively poorly in 
simple cases but perform relatively accu- 
rately in the complex. Presumably the ar- 
guments they advance in an attempt to 
establish this result can themselves be ex- 
amined by application of additional theory 
and more complicated experiments. 
3. Model Robustness. We have seen 
that changes in the market institutional 
environment can change market perfor- 
mance. These facts were discovered as ex- 
perimenters inquired about the accuracy 
of the competitive model under alterna- 
tive institutional regimes. These were 
checks on the robustness of the model un- 
der institutional perturbations. Similarly, 
some studies have checked the robustness 
16 See Plott (1979) and Smith (forthcoming) for a 
detailed discussion. 
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of the model under parametric perturba- 
tions such as number of competitors, de- 
mand elasticity, etc. Even though no for- 
mal theory (or any theory at all) exists 
about the influence of these factors, it is 
only natural to check. Then, once an im- 
portant variable is found which was not 
anticipated by existing theory, the data 
from the experiments serve as a motiva- 
tion for the development of extensions of 
the theory to cover the new facts. The 
influence of the posted price is a good ex- 
ample. No formal theory exists yet which 
completely explains the properties of this 
institution. 
4. Measurement. When most scholars 
think of experiments, they have measure- 
ment in mind (e.g., What is the probability 
of tacit collusion? What is the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium?). Laboratory 
experimental methods can be applied to 
these ends but none of the experiments 
above were predicated on the hypothesis 
that they were measuring numerical con- 
stants of nature. Questions of this type 
would seem to require elaborate sampling 
procedures and explicit definitions of the 
populations to which the measurement is 
to be applied. The studies above all in- 
volved hypotheses about relative behav- 
ior as opposed to numerical constants. 
5. Simulation. Another popular pre- 
conception about the function of experi- 
ments is simulation. In circumstances in 
which a policy is going to be imposed on 
a social system, simulation objectives in- 
volve an attempt to recreate the situation 
on a smaller scale in order to provide deci- 
sionmakers with some experience with 
how the situation might evolve. 
If there is no theory to indicate which 
variables are important, the complexity of 
the small situation must mirror the com- 
plexity of the large as closely as is possible. 
Furthermore, without theory to unify the 
observations, the experiment must be con- 
ducted enough times to assure the "statis- 
tical validity" of any asserted pattern in 
the results. Thus theory, even in the case 
of simulation, serves importantly to sim- 
plify the experimental process. The more 
that accepted theory can be invoked, the 
less the experimental process needs to 
"mirror" the natural analog. The ten- 
dency of scholars to reject experimental 
methods as irrelevant may be because 
they are fundamentally interested in sim- 
ulation while being unaware of the role 
of theory on the one hand and being very 
aware of the complexities of the situation 
(and the impossibility of recreating it) on 
the other hand. 
The arguments above are straightfor- 
ward, but it is easy to be pulled off track. 
Sometimes scholars use the term "real 
world" to refer to nonlaboratory processes 
and the term "artificial market" or "simu- 
lated market" to refer to laboratory mar- 
kets. Such language invites criticism by 
failing to acknowledge the argument 
above about laboratory markets being real 
markets. In addition, the language sug- 
gests that the primary test of relevance 
for laboratory market results is how 
closely the laboratory market approxi- 
mates some naturally occurring market 
thus implying that the purpose is simula- 
tion. This test neglects all of the other 
modes of learning from experiments. The 
laboratory environments provide an arena 
within which the relative accuracy of 
competing general theories can be evalu- 
ated and the poorer models rejected. Re- 
call that general theories and models of 
markets must apply to all special cases in- 
dependently of how those special cases 
compare with some other complicated 
special case which could itself be the result 
of several accidents of history. In essence, 
a demand that laboratory experiments de- 
signed to test general theories should sim- 
ulate some naturally occurring case in its 
full complexity denies the relevance of a 
study of special cases, and such a require- 
ment would pose just as many problems 
for experimental methods in the physical 
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science as it would for experimental eco- 
nomics. 
The problem of relevance can surface 
in many different forms. In the remaining 
paragraphs four of the most common 
sources of skepticism will be discussed. 
The first argument is a claim that "real" 
businessmen do not behave as do the sub- 
jects in these experiments. Stated like this 
the argument is not a criticism of experi- 
mental methods, it is a hypothesis about 
behavior in different subject pools and is 
thus a call for more experiments (with 
businessmen subjects). Similarly, argu- 
ments that the monetary amounts in- 
volved were too little (or too much) are 
simply demands for more experiments. 
The fact of the matter is, however, that 
a variety of subjects and payment levels 
have been used. The Hong and Plott 
(1982) study, for example, used employed 
adults. To date, no subject pool differences 
which bear on the reliability of economic 
theory have been reported. 
The next three arguments derive from 
the fact that naturally occurring phenom- 
ena are inherently more complex than are 
laboratory processes. The first argument 
is that the laboratory environment is arti- 
ficial. Exactly why is not articulated, but 
with this argument the word is used many 
times and preferably loudly. It probably 
results from a gestalt view that there are 
so many important variables that they 
cannot be enumerated and that they in- 
teract in ways that are necessarily pre- 
cluded in the laboratory. 
This argument, notice, is not an argu- 
ment against experimental methods in 
economics, it is an argument against 
experimental methods in general. The 
physical scientists must deal with it and 
so must the economists. Since the asser- 
tion cannot be falsified, the only answer 
lies in experimental work that has been 
helpful in generating successful models 
and points of view regarding more com- 
plex processes. As applied researchers find 
the data from experiments useful in shap- 
ing their own hypotheses and beliefs, this 
argument becomes less important. 
The second argument is more specific 
in that it notes that naturally occurring 
processes do not occur in isolation. Indus- 
tries are embedded in a larger social con- 
text. Businessmen have social relation- 
ships and friendships. They also know that 
their decisions while with one firm, may 
affect their possibilities for changing 
firms. 
This argument suggests that behavior 
in very complex environments may follow 
different laws than those which govern be- 
havior in relatively simple situations. This 
is an excellent reason for being careful in 
any attempt to extrapolate behavior from 
a laboratory to a complex industry. Notice, 
however, that it is not an argument 
against experimental methods. It is an ar- 
gument for a particular type of experi- 
ment-one in which the complexity of the 
experimental environment is gradually in- 
creased to make its characteristics more 
nearly similar to those of a given industry. 
If complications destroy the applicability 
of models, it might be possible to identify 
the precise complications which cause the 
problem and adjust the model accord- 
ingly. In a sense this program of increasing 
complexity is exactly how experiments are 
proceeding. 
The final criticism also relies on the 
complexity of naturally occurring pro- 
cesses. How is one to know if the elasticity 
of demand and costs used in an experi- 
ment or if the particular market institu- 
tion are those of the industry? If the results 
of the laboratory experiments are to be 
applied, shouldn't these be "right"? The 
answer to these types of criticisms are still 
more experiments under varying parame- 
ters. With a wide range of parameters ex- 
plored, the question collapses into a judg- 
ment about parameters and not the 
experimental methods. 
All of these arguments should make one 
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cautious about extrapolating results gen- 
erated from laboratory processes to natu- 
rally occurring processes. This type of ex- 
tension must be dealt with artfully in the 
physical sciences as well as in economics. 
It is the most difficult task that any re- 
searcher faces. Experiments are simply an 
additional source of data and experience 
that one adds to other sources in making 
judgments about how the world works. 
An easier task, involving a somewhat 
negative approach, places the burden of 
proof on those who advocate theories. 
General theories apply in special cases. 
They should therefore be expected to 
work in the simple laboratory environ- 
ments and if they do not or if a competing 
theory works better, the burden of proof 
is on the advocate to tell us exactly why 
we should not judge him to be wrong. By 
adopting this point of view, researchers 
can use data from laboratory economics 
to reduce the size of the set of competing 
ideas. 
VI. Closing Remarks 
Experimental studies demonstrate 
clearly that market institutions and prac- 
tices can influence market performance. 
Variables traditionally classified as aspects 
of market structure are also of demonstra- 
ble importance. Furthermore, rather stan- 
dard mathematical models are able to 
capture much of what can be observed 
behaviorally. 
Three models do well in predicting 
market prices and quantity: the competi- 
tive equilibrium, the Cournot model, and 
the monopoly (joint maximization) model. 
Experiments help define the conditions 
under which each of these alternative 
models apply. Some tendency exists for 
the error of a model when applied to data 
to be sensitive to structural and institu- 
tional variables (e.g., posted prices tend 
to be higher than prices under oral double 
auctions) but generally speaking, when a 
model applies, it does so with reasonable 
accuracy. 
Interestingly enough, while experimen- 
tal studies demonstrate that it is possible 
to model economic processes, they have 
also uncovered a problem in determining 
the conditions under which a model will 
be applicable. There is an interaction be- 
tween variables which has not been fully 
explained. It is not the case that competi- 
tors are capable of collusive activity when 
merely recognizing a harmony of inter- 
ests. It is also not the case that competitors 
cannot collude in the absence of direct 
communication and the enforcement of 
agreements. Competitors seem to be will- 
ing to collude (so the rivalistic hypothe- 
ses17 advanced in the early experimental 
studies can be safely dropped) but some 
market structures and institutions make 
it easy while others make it almost impos- 
sible (in the sense that successful collusion 
has never been observed). Even a mo- 
nopolist has difficulty within certain mar- 
ket institutions. Existing theory does not 
tell us exactly why this occurs, but the data 
suggest that one key is the behavior of 
the buyers. The data also suggest that mar- 
ket performance is very fragile (or "non- 
linear") with respect to underlying struc- 
tural and institutional variables and that 
"slight" changes (from four to two firms, 
or from price posting to some other insti- 
tution) can switch a market from "com- 
petitive" to "collusive" or vice versa. 
No doubt the ultimate usefulness of ex- 
perimental work will be determined by 
demonstrations that experiments provide 
insights about what one finds upon close 
examination of industries. Prosecutors and 
regulators must choose which cases to 
prosecute and what reliefs to pursue, and 
frequently the choices must be based on 
very thin data and controversial economic 
17 This hypothesis maintained that competitors will 
attempt to maximize relative profits, thereby trans- 
forming the market into a zero sum game. 
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theories. The facts which might falsify the 
theory are often impossible to obtain with- 
out undertaking the long and expensive 
process of litigation. Experiments are an 
alternative, relatively inexpensive, and 
relatively quick source of data. How these 
data will be regarded by the courts is yet 
to be determined (John B. Kirkwood, 
1981) but there seems to be no substantial 
difference between data from experimen- 
tal markets and data from other types of 
experiments. Of course, this source of data 
has one more substantial advantage. The 
fact that experiments can always be rerun 
and the validity of claims checked, places 
severe veracity constraints upon those 
who might enter such data as evidence 
in a court proceeding. 
APPENDIX 
The instructions below are typical of those used 
in the experiments reviewed. Both posted bid mar- 
ket and oral double auction organizations are in- 
cluded. These instructions are read by the experi- 
menter. The incentive forms (Figure 1) are also 
distributed. The forms are also reproduced on the 
blackboard and completed by the experimenter as 
directed by the instructions and the example in the 
instructions. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
General 
This is an experiment in the economics of market 
decision making. Various research foundations have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions 
are simple and if you follow them carefully and make 
good decisions you might earn a considerable 
amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment we are going to simulate a mar- 
ket in which some of you will be buyers and some 
of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days 
or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you 
will find a sheet, labeled Buyer or Seller, which de- 
scribes the value to you of any decisions you might 
make. YOU ARE NOT TO REVEAL THIS INFOR- 
MATION TO ANYONE. It is your own private infor- 
mation. 
Specific Instructions to Buyers 
During each market period you are free to pur- 
chase from any seller or sellers as many units as you 
might want. For the first unit that you buy during 
a trading period you will receive the amount listed 
in row (1) marked 1st unit redemption value; if you 
buy a second unit you will receive the additional 
amount listed in row (5) marked 2nd unit redemp- 
tion value; etc. The profits from each purchase 
(which are yours to keep) are computed by taking 
the difference between the redemption value and 
purchase price of the unit bought. Under no condi- 
tions may you buy a unit for a price which exceeds 
the redemption value. In addition to this profit you 
will receive a 5 cent commission for each purchase. 
That is, 
[your earnings = (redemption value) 
- (purchase price) + 0.05 commission]. 
Suppose for example that you buy two units and 
that your redemption value for the first unit is $200 
and for the second unit is $180. If you pay $150 
for your first unit and $160 for the second unit, your 
earnings are: 
$ earnings from 1st - 200- 150 + 0.05 = 50.05 
$ earnings from 2nd = 180- 160 + 0.05 = 20.05 
total $ earnings = 50.05 + 20.05 = 70.10. 
The blanks on the table will help you record your 
profits. The purchase price of the first unit you buy 
during the first period should be recorded on row 
(2) at the time of purchase. You should then record 
the profits on this purchase as directed on rows (3) 
and (4). At the end of the period record the total 
of profits and commissions on the last row (41) on 
the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded 
similarly. 
Specific Instructions to Sellers 
During each market period you are free to sell 
to any buyer or buyers as many units as you might 
want. The first unit that you sell during a trading 
period you obtain at a cost of the amount listed on 
the attached sheet in the row (2) marked cost of 
1st unit; if you sell a second unit you will incur the 
cost listed in the row (6) marked cost of 1st unit; 
etc. The profits from each sale (which are yours to 
keep) are computed by taking the difference be- 
tween the price at which you sold and the cost of 
the unit. Under no conditions may you sell a unit 
at a price below the cost of the unit. In addition 
to this profit you will receive a 5 cent commission 
for each sale. That is, 
[your earnings = (sale price of unit) 
- (cost of unit) + 0.05 commission]. 
Your total profits and commissions for a trading 
period, which are yours to keep, are computed by 
adding up the profit and commissions on sales made 
during the trading period. 
Suppose for example that your cost of the 1st unit 
is $140 and your cost of the second unit is $160. 
For illustrative purposes we will consider only a two- 
unit case. If you sell the first unit at $200 and the 
second unit at $190, your earnings are: 
$ earnings from 1st = 200 - 140 + 0.05 = 60.05 
$ earnings from 2nd = 190- 160 + 0.05 = 30.05 
total $ earnings = 60.05 + 30.05 = 90.10. 
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The blanks on the table will help you record your 
profits. The sale price of the 1st unit you sell during 
the 1st period should be recorded on row (1) at the 
time of sale. You should then record the profits on 
this sale as directed on rows (3) and (4). At the end 
of the period record the total of profits and commis- 
sions on the last row (41) on the page. Subsequent 
periods should be recorded similarly. 
Market Organization (Posted bid instructions) 
The market for this commodity is organized as 
follows: we open the market for each trading day. 
Each buyer decides on a purchase price which he 
will write on one of the cards provided. The buyers 
will be given two minutes to submit their prices. 
The cards will be collected and the prices written 
on the blackboard. Sellers will then be free to make 
offers to sell whatever quantities they desire and to 
specify the buyer to whom they wish to sell. Offers 
will be made as follows: a seller will be chosen using 
random numbers, and will state the quantity he 
wishes to sell and the buyer to whom he wishes to 
sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the sell- 
er's offer by stating the quantity he wishes to buy. 
However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be 
prepared to buy at least one unit. If the first buyer 
will not purchase all units the seller wants to sell, 
the seller is free to choose a second buyer, and so 
on. 
When the first seller has made all his contracts, 
another seller will be selected at random and he 
will make his desired purchases. The process will 
be continued until there are no offers to sell. This 
completes the trading day. We will reopen the mar- 
ket for a new trading day by having buyers submit 
new prices and the process will be repeated. Except 
for the offers and their acceptance you are not to 
speak to any other subject. You are free to make 
as much profit as you can. 
Are there any questions? 
Market Organization (Oral Double Auction) 
The market for this commodity is organized as 
follows: we open the market for a trading period 
(a trading "day"). The period lasts for - minutes. 
Any buyer (seller) is free at any time during the 
period, to raise his hand and make a verbal bid (offer) 
to buy (sell) one unit of the commodity at a specified 
price. The bid (offer) must be higher (lower) than 
the outstanding bid (offer) should one exist. Any 
seller (buyer) is free at any time to accept or not 
accept the bid (offer) of any buyer (seller). If a bid 
(offer) is accepted, a binding contract has been closed 
for a single unit and the buyer and seller will record 
the contract price to be included in their earnings. 
Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by 
a random choice of buyer or seller. Except for the 
bids (offers) and their acceptance you are not to 
speak to any other subject. There are likely to be 
many bids and offers that are not accepted, but you 
are free to keep trying, and as a buyer or a seller 
you are free to make as much profit as you can. 
Are there any questions? 
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